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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that I am a young man in an impoverished
neighborhood. One Saturday afternoon, as I stand in front of an
apartment building with a few friends, a passing pedestrian
bumps me in the chest, looks back over his shoulder, and keeps
walking. I find his behavior threatening, and I react violently.
In truth, the bump was just the misstep of an exhausted night-
shift fry cook, the look back just an anxious glance.
Or imagine that I am a police officer working overnight in
a patrol car. The police dispatcher radios that there has just
been an armed robbery, and that the robber-a young black man
in a winter coat-is on foot somewhere in my vicinity. Soon
enough, I see a man who matches the dispatcher's description
fumbling at the door of an apartment building. I pull up to the
curb, get out with gun drawn, and order him to put his hands up.
He turns to face me, pulling something black out of his pocket. I
find his behavior threatening, and I react violently. In truth, the
black object was just his wallet; he was going to show me his
green card.1
1 The hypothetical is loosely based on widely reported accounts of the shooting of
Amadou Diallo by New York City police officers in 1999. See, e.g., Michael Cooper,
[Vol. 83:565
SCHEMATIC PSYCHOLOGY
If I kill the tired fry cook or the man with the wallet,
should I be blamed? Should I be punished as a criminal? The
standard answer to both questions is "yes." I killed another
human being, voluntarily and intentionally. What I did was
wrong-life-taking violates a fundamental moral prohibition-
and there was no countervailing justification present. It may be
true that I believed it was the right thing to do, but my belief was
not, under the circumstances, reasonable. And there is nothing
to excuse my poor judgment. I was not insane, an infant,
intoxicated, or otherwise mentally impaired. I did not experience
an irresistible impulse, I was not so impassioned that I lost
control, and I did not face the sort of pressure under which "a
person of reasonable firmness" would crack. In short, I did a
terrible wrong for which there was no justification or excuse. It
is right for you to be indignant at what I have done and right for
the state to punish me.
This is compelling reasoning, but it is not invulnerable.
As moral theorists have long observed, certain considerations
have the tendency to chip away at our confidence in a
wrongdoer's blameworthiness. We might revisit what was
"reasonable" by trying to understand the circumstances more
fully. Perhaps in the killer's impoverished neighborhood, the
failure to punish a bumper makes the bumpee look weak and
puts him at risk of violence. Perhaps in certain sorts of police
work it is sensible self-preservation to assume that black objects
from suspects' pockets are guns. Or we might look more closely
at the killer's psychic frame at the time of the killing. We might
find there demoralizing confusion, raw fear, pent-up rage, hunger
for stimulation and excitement, shame and insecurity, self-
destructive and suicidal impulses, paranoid projection, and so on.
As we flesh out the story with these sorts of concrete and
particular details, the impulse to blame may diminish as other,
competing impulses gain strength.
In this Article, I will try to chip away at the criminal's
blameworthiness from yet another vantage. I will argue that
recent empirical research regarding our acquisition and use of
schemas and other knowledge structures raises unexpected and
Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an Unarmed Man Is Killed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
1999, at Al.
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unappreciated problems for moral and criminal responsibility in
cases like the ones described above. I start, in Part II, with an
overview of several interrelated lines of research in contemporary
empirical psychology, which I will call, collectively, "schematic
psychology."2 According to this research, we use schemas and
other knowledge structures-simplified mental representations
of complex real-world and imagined phenomena-to organize and
sift through the potentially overwhelming flood of information
our senses bring us. Indeed, such structures are fundamental to
nearly all of our cognition about the world around us. Our
dependence on such knowledge structures, however, has
unexpected, profound, and sometimes perverse ramifications for
our behavior. For one thing, such structures significantly skew
our thoughts about and reactions to people and events,
shaping and channeling how we feel about, interpret, and
perceive them. For another, our knowledge structures are,
themselves, startlingly vulnerable to both immediate and
persisting environmental and social influences. Thus, schematic
psychology suggests that our thoughts and choices are skewed in
2 The term schematic psychology does not appear in the literature. I use it here
as a convenient shorthand to refer to several lines of research that involve or relate
to our use of schemas and other related knowledge structures in normal cognition,
and which (I propose) collectively generate certain problems for conventional
accounts of moral and criminal responsibility.
For more comprehensive surveys of the material encompassed by the term schematic
psychology, see generally SuSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION
(2d ed. McGraw-Hill 1991) (1984) (especially chapters four, "Social Categories and
Schemas," five, "Conditions of Schema Use," seven, "Social Encoding," and twelve,
"Behavior and Cognition"); ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF
PEOPLE (1999) (especially chapters two, "Concepts," six, "Hot Cognition," seven,
"Automatic Processes," eight, "Stereotypes," and eleven, "Culture"); DOUGLAS L.
MEDIN, BRIAN H. Ross & ARTHUR B. MARKMAN, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (4th ed.
John Wiley & Sons 2005) (1992) (especially chapter ten, "Concepts and Categories");
GORDON B. MOSKOWITZ, SOCIAL COGNITION: UNDERSTANDING SELF AND OTHERS
(2005) (especially chapters two, "Automaticity and Control," three, "Categories and
Category Structure," four, "On Schemas and Cognitive Misers," nine, "On Perceptual
Readiness," ten, "Temporary Accessibility/Priming Effects," and eleven, "Stereotypes
and Expectancies").
There is some disagreement among psychologists about the proper use of the term
"schema." A broad use equates schema with "mental representation," while a more
constrained use associates the term with particular sorts of mental representation.
KUNDA, supra, at 15-17. For the purposes of this Article, I adopt the broad use. By
"schematic psychology" I mean psychology pertaining to our acquisition and use of
knowledge structures.
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surprising ways by knowledge structures that are, in turn, highly
susceptible to external influence.
Part III contends that schematic psychology can fund
two sorts of challenges to traditional accounts of criminal
responsibility.' Part III.A sets out an internal challenge. It
accepts (arguendo) that traditional accounts of responsibility
correctly identify the conditions that must be satisfied in order
for a person to be criminally responsible and argues that
schematic psychology calls into question one of these conditions.
More specifically, it argues that schematic blind spots and biases
impair our "moral sensitivity"-and especially our sensitivity to
morally significant facts about our circumstances-more often
and more profoundly than we realize. If this is true, then human
actors may fail the conditions for criminal responsibility more
often than we have (traditionally) imagined.
Part III.B offers an external challenge. It argues that
schematic psychology itself raises hard questions about the
project of attributing responsibility to individuals itself.
Schematic psychology shows that our conduct is influenced in
deep and unexpected ways by social and environmental
phenomena, both circumstantial and constitutive. If this is right,
holding us criminally responsible for our conduct raises fairness
problems, not only because criminal punishment comes to seem
like a lottery (produced by phenomena that the individual actor
cannot control), but also because social and environmental
phenomena come to seem more apt targets for the resentment
and indignation usually directed at individuals who commit
crimes. These fairness problems may, in turn, significantly
undercut the reactive attitudes that sustain our blaming and
punishing practices.
Taken together, these two challenges offer bracing new
reasons to doubt the traditional justifications for holding
criminals responsible. Moreover, they parallel and augment
several other social-science challenges that appear to converge
I Legal theorists have not yet turned their attention to whether schematic
psychology has significant ramifications for criminal responsibility.
More attention has been paid (in philosophy and legal theory) to a related but
distinct question about the ramifications of another line in empirical psychology-
situationist psychology. I have discussed situationist psychology and criminal
responsibility at length. See generally Anders Kaye, Does Situationist Psychology
Have Radical Implications for Criminal Responsibility?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 611 (2008).
20091
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on the same conclusion, including challenges grounded in
situationist psychology and the sociology of criminogenic social
conditions. In this sense, schematic psychology is doubly
important. In itself, it raises new doubts about the traditional
rationales for holding criminals responsible. More than that, it
contributes to the momentum of the broader, cumulative
challenge from the social sciences generally.
II. SCHEMATIC PSYCHOLOGY
This Part offers an overview of schematic psychology-a
school of empirical research showing that human beings acquire,
organize, and use information in a schematic way, which has
important ramifications for our perceptions and interpretations
of the world around us, for our emotions and motivations, and for
our decisions and choices. Here, I will describe schemas and
similar knowledge structures, discuss the influence they have on
perception and interpretation, explain how schemas are activated
and become influential, show how difficult it is for us to control or
counteract the influence that activated schemas have over us,
and say something about the extent to which our schemas are
dependent on environmental and social context. The Parts that
follow will consider what these features of schematic psychology
mean for moral and criminal responsibility.
A. The Foundations of Schematic Cognition: Categories,
Schemas, Scripts, Stereotypes, and Other Knowledge
Structures
In this Article, I will use the term schematic cognition to
refer to a set of related phenomena in ordinary human cognition.
These phenomena all revolve around a cognitive process for
organizing the enormous wealth of information we take in and
retain in our daily lives. The defining feature of this process
is that it reduces the unruly, constant flood of information
available to our senses to schemas and other related knowledge
structures-structured networks of abstract concepts, which can
be stored in long-term memory and referenced to identify and
understand the stimuli in our environment. Here, I start by
describing the way we utilize the schema and other knowledge
structures in ordinary cognition.
570 [Vol. 83:565
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A human being can register an extraordinary wealth of
information about her environment. For example, she can
effortlessly and nearly instantly scan vast tracts of space with
her eyes, registering mountains and fleas in the same split
second. But merely registering such a wealth of environmental
stimuli (the "'great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer
world' ,,)4 means nothing unless she can sift through it to find the
information that matters to her-to her survival, her welfare, her
goals, and her tastes. We cannot "make sense" of the world
around us "without some internal system for sorting through
all this information."5  Unfortunately, there are significant
constraints on the internal systems we use to sift all this
information; for our "processing capacity" is "bounded" in obvious
ways.6 As a result, in order to facilitate information sifting with
limited processing capacity, the human actor relies on schemas
and other knowledge structures.7 This schematic cognition is the
process by which we extract the information that matters from
the enormous flood of information we receive via our senses every
moment of our conscious life.
Schematic cognition begins with categorization.' In the
context of human cognition, the term "category" is typically used
to refer to a mental construct created by a human mind and used
to organize data stored in long-term memory.9 The construct
consists of a collection of "mental representations" of "abstract or
concrete items that the cognitive system treats as equivalent for
4 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 173 (quoting WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC
OPINION 55 (1922)); see also KUNDA, supra note 2, at 17.
5 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 112. "'[Wlere we to utilize fully our capacity for
registering the differences in things and to respond to each event encountered as
unique, we would soon be overwhelmed by the complexity of our environment.'" Id.
at 173 (quoting JEROME S. BRUNER, JACQUELINE J. GOODNOW & GEORGE A. AUSTIN,
A STUDY OF THINKING 1 (Wiley 1956)); see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at
175.
6 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 174.
7 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 98 ("A schema may be defined as a cognitive
structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including
its attributes and the relations among those attributes.").
I Id. at 105. The term "classification" is also used here. See, e.g., KUNDA, supra
note 2, at 17-18; MEDIN, ROSS & MARKMAN, supra note 2, at 318.
9 More precisely, the mental representation is called a "concept," while the items
represented in the concept are called a "category." KUNDA, supra note 2, at 16;
MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 111. Following the common practice of social cognition
textbooks, I will collapse the two terms, using "category" to describe both. See, e.g.,
20091
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some purpose." ° The items in the grouping are understood to
"belong together"" or have a "family resemblance," in that they
all have at least some of the features associated with the
category.' 2 The "internal structure of [the] categor[y]" itself is
generally "fluid" and "well described as a fuzzy set." 3
The items that we include in our categories are items that
we have become aware of through one process or another. Many
of them, of course, are items we have perceived directly with our
own senses (for example, bananas); some are items we have
learned about second-hand (for example, jaguars) or simply
imagined (jaguar bananas?). 14 As we acquire experience with or
knowledge about such items, we create mental representations of
them and then place these representations in mental constructs
containing collections of such representations organized around
their distinctive characteristics. These constructs are our
categories.
We use these categories to filter, sort, and understand the
flood of information we receive from the world around us. 5 As
sensory information pours in, we preconsciously 6 detect and
isolate discrete phenomena-objects, sounds, smells, etc.-in our
environment (a process that itself must involve some "primitive
categorization"; how else, for example, is an object distinguished
from a backdrop?). 7  Once a phenomenon has been isolated,
we use our categorical knowledge to identify it, comparing
the phenomenon's features to those associated with our
existing categories. Through this "cue search," we match the
phenomenon with a category of items having similar features"
10 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 111 (quoting Arthur B. Markman & Brian H.
Ross, Category Use and Category Learning, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 592, 592-93
(2003)).
11 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 51.
12 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 115. Today, a common view is that categories
need not have any essential features or "defining features." See KUNDA, supra note
2, at 28-29.
13 FIsKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 107; see also MEDIN, Ross & MARKMAN,
supra note 2, at 324, 326-29 (discussing fuzziness and family resemblance).
14 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 147; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 121
(noting that we can acquire categories for entirely imaginary things, like Superman).
15 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 98-99; KUNDA, supra note 2, at 17-18;
MEDIN, Ross & MARKMAN, supra note 2, at 216-17.
16 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 246; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 130.
17 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 113, 130.
18 Id. at 113; see also KUNDA, supra note 2, at 28-29.
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and make a probabilistic inference that the stimulus at issue is a
member of the matching category. Given the observed features
of the stimulus and the ways in which they match the features
associated with the category, the stimulus is likely to be a
member of the category.19 In this way, we assimilate new
phenomena to pre-existing categories, 0 and thus make sense of
the new information received by our senses.2'
This is where the value lies in categorical thinking.
Assimilating new stimuli to pre-existing categories simplifies our
environment, enables us to understand the significance of the
new stimuli, and to react in ways consistent with our goals.
Thanks to categorization, "we do not have to be taught de novo at
each encounter that the object before us is or is not a tree";2 2 we
do not have to reinvent the wheel each time we encounter it;
instead, we can identify it on the basis of a handful of salient
features. This "reduces the complexity of the environment"2'3 and
frees up valuable "cognitive resources" for other important tasks
19 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 28-36; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 113, 119, 166
("The more features that are matched between a stimulus and a category, and the
fewer the mismatches, the greater the chance the stimulus will be seen as an
instance of that category."); MEDIN, ROSS & MARKMAN, supra note 2, at 324. The
probabilistic model referenced in the text has been highly influential, but there are
other competing models, including the classical model and theory-based model. See,
e.g., KUNDA, supra note 2, at 25-28 (classical model); id. at 36-41 (theory-based
model); MEDIN, ROSS & MARKMAN, supra note 2, at 322 (classical model); id. at 340
(theory-based model). The differences between these sorts of models are significant,
but they do not appear to make a difference to the analysis of responsibility offered
in Part III.
20 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 112.
21 Id. at 111. In particular, categorization has enabled us to use our previously
acquired knowledge to understand the flood of new incoming data. FISKE & TAYLOR,
supra note 2, at 98; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 111, 121-25. Assuming that
through the normal process of category construction we constructed and retained a
sufficient array of useful categories containing items encountered in experience,
other learning, and imagination, newly encountered stimuli can be identified and
understood by comparing them to the categories we already constructed. The salient
features of the current stimulus can be compared to the distinctive features of our
already existing categories, and when a particular stimulus has a sufficient number
of important features in common with an already existing category, it may be
assimilated to that category. Categorization is placing a new stimulus into a class of
familiar things. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 98.
22 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 121 (quoting BRUNER, GOODNOW & AUSTIN,
supra note 5, at 12) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21 Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also FISKE &
TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 97.
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(such as evaluation and decision-making).24 Moreover, having
placed the new stimulus within a category, we can now attribute
to the stimulus a whole host of characteristics that were not
evident on first perception-the features associated with the
category.25 A stimulus categorized as a banana is now seen as
something I might eat and as something that will remain in more
or less one place for an extended period. In contrast, a stimulus
categorized as a jaguar is seen as one that may eat me and that
will not stay in one place. In this way, assimilating present
stimuli to information-laden categories allows us to use prior-
acquired knowledge to know more about present stimuli than we
have directly perceived.26 It also improves our ability to react to
the stimuli in ways appropriate to our goals.27 For example, if
one of our goals is survival, our categorical knowledge about
bananas instructs us to approach them in a leisurely fashion.
With jaguars, our categorical knowledge alerts us that we ought
to flee. We have made predictions about the likely behavior of
the perceived stimulus based on the characteristics associated
with its category, and we have acted accordingly.
Categorization is quite complex and is not limited to
discrete objects, sounds, smells, or events. Rather, we generate
knowledge structures for wildly diverse sorts of information. For
example, we develop schemas 8 for ourselves (I have the following
features . . . ).29 Likewise, we have schemas for social roles and
relationships," which organize our knowledge about the set of
2 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 19-20; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 173-74; see also
id. at 184 ("[The ability to use minimal cues quickly in categorizing the events of the
environment is what gives the organism its lead time in adjusting to
events.... [Slchema use has benefits to the perceiver: Mental energy and resources
are available to be put to use elsewhere.") (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at
192 (Schematic thinking "allows us to reduce the effort we expend on some tasks so
that we may increase our ability to process other tasks.").
25 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 18; MEDIN, Ross & MARKMAN, supra note 2, at 318;
MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 121-22.
26 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 98 ("Schemas facilitate ... top-down,
conceptually driven ... processes, . . . heavily influenced by one's ... prior
knowledge.").
27 Id. at 155; MEDIN, ROSS & MARKMAN, supra note 2, at 318-19; MOSKOWITZ,
supra note 2, at 123.
28 See MEDIN, ROSS & MARKMAN, supra note 2, at 215-19 (defining schema).
2 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 118; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 158.
20 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 51; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 161.
574 [Vol. 83:565
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norms and behaviors attached to a social position." We are
likely to have person and role schemas-stereotypes-for
genders, races, and occupations32 and relational schemas for
various sorts of relationships between people (parent-child,
friend-friend),33  including behavior patterns and recurring
thoughts, feelings, and motivations associated with those
relationships. 34 We also have "place schemas"31 and often draw
on script schemas for particular sorts of situations or events
that associate particular action patterns with particular
environments, "dictat[ing] specific ways of behaving for specific
situations."36 For example (as one author suggests), we may have
distinctive scripts for the sequence of steps necessary to order
food from an ice cream truck versus those appropriate to a fancy
restaurant.3 1 More abstractly, we also utilize an array of content-
free schemas including balance, linear-ordering, and causal
schema.3
These sorts of knowledge structures are the basis for
schematic thinking. In order to process, interpret, and react to
information about the world around us with the limited
processing resources available to us, we must use shortcuts. 9
We cannot reinvent the wheel each time we see it. Instead, we
create and retain knowledge structures for the stimuli we
encounter or learn about. Using such structures enables us to
identify and understand immanent stimuli. It also enables us to
predict what other features those stimuli will have-that is, the
other features in the category-and to react accordingly.
31 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 161.
32 FiSKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 118-19; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 161.
3 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 161.
u Id. at 161.
3 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 121.
36 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 162; see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at
119-20; MEDIN, ROSS & MARKMAN, supra note 2, at 219-23.
37 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 162.
m FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 120.
39 Of course, we are not "doomed to think only categorically." MOSKOWITZ, supra
note 2, at 176; see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 136. In particular cases, we
can choose to attend to specific stimuli in a more detail-responsive way, and may "do
so... when goals and circumstances dictate." MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 176. But
we cannot do so at all times with respect to all stimuli; our processing capacity is not
sufficient.
20091
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B. Schematic Cognition's Influence: Perception, Interpretation,
and Conduct
Schematic cognition serves a useful-indeed, essential-
function in enabling us to filter, sort, and understand the flood of
information we encounter in our daily lives. At the same time,
however, our schemas have a surprising and significant influence
on how we perceive the world and how we interpret the things we
encounter in it, skewing and shaping what we see and how we
understand it. Moreover, they exercise this influence in a
surprisingly unpredictable way, for schematic cognition is highly
sensitive to circumstance. Knowledge structures typically lie
dormant in long-term memory4 ° until appropriate stimuli trigger
the "retrieval" of the concept, making the concept "perceptually
ready" or "accessible."4' It is when a concept becomes accessible
that it exercises its influence on perception and interpretation.
Both these aspects of schematic cognition-accessibility and
influence-play important roles in the choices and conduct of
schematic thinkers.
1. Accessibility
Knowledge structures influence cognition and conduct when
circumstances trigger their retrieval from long-term memory and
make them accessible. This can happen in at least two ways.
In some cases, a stimulus in the immediate environment-a
prime-temporarily charges the knowledge structure. In other
cases, recurring exposure to a stimulus renders a structure
"chronically accessible."43
Sometimes, temporary or passing stimuli can charge a
schema, giving the schema "a heightened state of activation" and
resulting in "perceptual readiness."44 This sort of temporary
activation is called "priming."45 The crux of the priming process
40 See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 390-91.
41 Id.; FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 257.
42 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 355. Categories typically lie "dormant in long-
term memory" in a "latent rather than in an active state," unless they are
"activated," in which case they become able to "influence thought processes." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 145,
169, 257-65; KUNDA, supra note 2, at 51.
' KUNDA, supra note 2, at 24; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 390.
4 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 387; see also KUNDA, supra note 2, at 51.
45 FisKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 257; KUNDA, supra note 2, at 279-84;
MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 391.
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is that "exposure to a concept.., leads automatically to the
retrieval of the concept, and associated concepts from memory.
46
Retrieval renders the concept temporarily perceptually ready,
making it more likely to exert an influence on cognition and
conduct. As time passes, the primed concept will lose its
"charge," with the duration and strength of perceptual readiness
depending on the strength, recency, and frequency of the prime.47
Priming can occur in a variety of ways. A person can be
exposed to a concept through an "encounter" with a physical
example of the concept or "through its contemplation in the
mind."4" The actual or contemplated encounter with the concept
triggers its retrieval from memory, making the concept
accessible.49 Startlingly, a concept can be primed by even the
most minimal exposure to the concept. Indeed, it is well-
established that subliminal exposure to a concept can make the
concept accessible 0 : Subjects exposed to words for such a brief
time that they are not conscious of seeing those words can be
primed by those words; subliminal exposure to hostility related
words, for example, will make the concept of hostility accessible. 1
Thus, environmental stimuli can make concepts accessible
without our registering the stimulus and without our noting that
the concept has been triggered.52 Moreover, the process can be
direct or indirect. Direct priming involves an encounter with the
concept that is ultimately made accessible, as when hearing the
word "dog" makes the schema for dogs accessible. Indirect
priming works through spreading activation. 3 To use a common
metaphor, the "charge" associated with the priming stimulus
"spreads" through the network of concepts associated with the
concept, so that hearing the word "dog" charges not only the
concept "dog," but also associated concepts like "loyalty" and
"flea."1 4 In this way, exposure to an example of one concept can
46 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 396.
41 See id. at 402-03.
' Id. at 396.
'9 See id.
50 See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 272-73; KUNDA, supra note 2, at 23,
279-84; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 415-16.
"' See KUNDA, supra note 2, at 23, 281-82; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 416.
52 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 390.
53 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 48.
This metaphor adopts the view, common in cognitive theory, that knowledge
structures exist within associative networks-collections of nodes (consisting of
concepts) linked to each other to form a network. See, e.g., KUNDA, supra note 2, at
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prime not just that concept, but also other concepts closely
associated with it.
Priming makes knowledge structures temporarily accessible,
but a knowledge structure can also move into a state of
heightened or "chronic" accessibility-a state in which it is
"accessible at all times and ... applied wherever possible""5
-if
associated stimuli are frequently encountered.56 Repeatedly
"charging" the knowledge structure makes it accessible-and
thus influential-over the long haul. A knowledge structure may
be frequently charged either because the environment frequently
presents reminders or because the knowledge structure is "self-
defining" and "important" enough that the actor summons it on a
regular basis (as actors do with deeply held values or long-term
goals).5 7
For example, for Americans, concepts associated with
America are persistently charged by invocations and symbols of
America. Likewise, concepts associated with our families and
workplaces may be persistently charged by encounters with work
and family. So may concepts associated with our own most
central goals and motives, which we may recurringly encounter
in reflecting on our choices and plans.5 Frequently charged
concepts like these may enter a state of "chronic accessibility"-a
state in which they are perpetually susceptible to easy activation
by external stimuli.59
2. Influence
When a knowledge structure becomes accessible, it also
becomes influential in cognition and conduct. In particular,
"[olnce cued, schemas affect... what we notice" and "how we
46-51, 52; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 392 ("As one concept is charged, that charge
spreads along the associative network-triggering the related concepts to which it is
linked, and thus priming these associated concepts as well."). In fact, it appears that
the story is even more complex; for while some concepts have excitatory links to each
other (transmitting charges between them), other concepts have inhibitory links so
that activating one concept actively suppresses activation of the other. KUNDA,
supra note 2, at 49.
5 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 24.
See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 265-66; KUNDA, supra note 2, at 24;
MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 356, 379.
51 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 24.
5 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 356.
" See id. at 379.
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interpret what we notice." °  That is, accessible knowledge
structures skew perception and interpretation.
a. Perception
At the most basic level, accessible knowledge structures
shape "fundamental... processes of perception"6 1-significantly
influencing whether and to what extent we notice or become
aware of stimuli in our environment.62
One way in which they do this is by directing how we sort
and filter the flood of information our senses bring us. Generally,
this flood of information is stored in fleeting iconic and echoic
memory-where it resides for just a brief moment.63 We sort this
information preconsciously so that only a tiny fraction makes its
way into short-term memory and consciousness.64 Our "decisions
about what information to keep ... occur prior to our being
aware" that we have taken in the information, and thus "without
any conscious reflection or awareness."65  Accessible concepts
play a crucial role in this preconscious sorting process.66 An
accessible schema acts as a "scanning pattern,"67 which leaves us
"ready to detect and perceive certain stimuli"68 at the expense of
others. You will note different details about a house if you are
considering burgling it than if you are considering buying
it; 69 your schema for burgling involves certain expectations
about what burglars do and makes you more likely to notice
information relevant to a burglar's goals. Schemas are also
associated with a "confirmation bias" 0 : Once a schema has been
6o FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 122. "Accessible knowledge structures serve
an important processing function that guides attention, encoding, and retrieval of
information." MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 359; see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note
2, at 96-142 (discussing social categories and schemas).
61 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 358; see also KUNDA, supra note 2, at 18-20.
62 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 99, 117-18. "What we see and what we
think we have seen are determined in large part by schemas." MOSKOWITZ, supra
note 2, at 155.
63 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 357.
64Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
6 Id. at 358.
67 Id. at 356 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 Id. at 358.
' For a discussion of this memory study using the burgle/buy perspective
switch, see FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 125; MEDIN, ROSS & MARKMAN, supra
note 2, at 225-26; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 157.
70 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 178.
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activated, we become more likely to recognize or assimilate
information that is consistent with the schema 71 and more
likely to "deflect the reception of information that is
counterschematic." 72  For example, if you have a schema for
"men" and the schema associates men with a certain traits (for
example, insensitivity) you may be more likely to notice instances
illustrative of those traits (for example, instances of male
insensitivity) while failing to notice instances of schema-
inconsistent behavior (for example, male sensitivity). Your
schema has influenced what you have perceived and, in the
process, led you to perceive the world in a way that entrenches
the schema.7 ' Not surprisingly then, priming a category can
increase recognition of category-relevant information while
suppressing recognition of non-categorical stimuli. Priming
people to think about soccer hooligans leaves them more likely to
recognize hooligan-related words in word jumbles, but less likely
to recognize hooligan-inconsistent words (for example, "friendly")
in a word jumble. Likewise, a prime that evokes a negative
attitude will make you "readier" to see and respond to other
things associated with negative attitudes (for example, a snake
prime may make you more likely to notice spiders),7" and
exposure to a word that suggests happiness will make you faster
to perceive other happiness-associated stimuli. 6 In short, we see
"not ... what is there, but what the accessible constructs in the
mind make [us] perceptually ready to see."77
These effects are especially pervasive with chronically
accessible knowledge structures since the scanning patterns
these structures set up persist over time.78  Subjects perceive
words more quickly if the words are relevant to particular values
they hold-their values supply chronically accessible knowledge
structures and influence how easily they perceive quickly
71 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 163; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 175-76, 178-81.
72 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 176.
11 See KUNDA, supra note 2, at 163.
74 See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 182-83.
71 Id. at 396-97; see also KUNDA, supra note 2, at 292 (discussing affective
priming).
76 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 397-98.
77 Id. at 386. We are especially likely to fall prey to this bias when we are under
cognitive strain (that is, when we must devote substantial cognitive resources to a
cognitive task). Id. at 175.
78 Id. at 358.
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flashed words." Likewise, auto-motives-"chronically accessible
goals" 8°-make us more likely to perceive goal-relevant stimuli:8 '
If a chronic goal is triggered by some goal-related stimulus, we
become quicker to perceive other goal-related stimuli (a goal-
related cue makes us more likely to perceive other goal-related
stimuli).82  More broadly, chronically accessible knowledge
structures have a pervasive influence on "how a person sees the
world." 3 A person who often encounters stimuli associated with
America will be more likely to notice stimuli relevant to his
schema for America.84 A person who has a strong commitment
to egalitarianism will consistently be more likely to notice
opportunities for egalitarian conduct-the chronic accessibility of
the schema for egalitarianism makes him chronically more likely
to notice egalitarianism-relevant features of his environment.8 5
If your social context consistently charges concepts associated
with appearance, you may recurringly notice colleagues' haircuts,
rather than their ideas.86 And at a cocktail party, you will often
notice your name being spoken across the room, even though you
did not notice the rest of the conversation-your self-schema is
constantly charged. 7 In short, chronically accessible knowledge
structures profoundly influence which details we notice as we
survey our environment."8
On the flip side, chronically accessible concepts and motives
can also function as a "preconscious defense system"--a
"perceptual defense" that persistently "prevent[s us] ... from
consciously seeing" "stimuli that are threatening to our
chronically accessible goals." 9 We can "preconsciously detect
undesirable stimuli and then prevent ourselves from consciously
noting" those stimuli.90 For this reason, it takes us longer
to perceive taboo words than non-taboo words-we suppress
'9 Id. at 358-59.
80 Auto-motives are "chronically accessible goals, motives, and needs" that
influence "attention, judgment, and behavior." Id. at 360.
1 See id.
82 See id. at 360-61.
83 Id. at 356.
84 See id. at 354.
5 See id. at 360-61.
Id. at 379 (discussing the example suggested by Moskowitz)..
87 Id. at 357 (referring to this phenomenon as the "cocktail party effect").
s See id. at 379-81.
Id. at 373 (emphasis omitted).
0 Id.
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consciousness of the threatening words.91 Indeed, we manifest
galvanic reactions to taboo words even when we are not
conscious that we have seen them (as when they are flashed
subliminally)-we detect them preconsciously without allowing
them into consciousness. 92 Our chronically accessible knowledge
structures block conscious perception.93
Schematic cognition, then, intervenes even in how we scan
the world around us, steering us toward perception of some
phenomena and away from perceiving others, shaping and
skewing the information that supports all our practical reasoning
about the world. In this sense, schematic cognition "color[s] our
reality.- ,94
b. Interpretation
Schematic thinking influences us in another, similarly
profound way: It biases our interpretations of perceived
phenomena. 95
Many of the phenomena we encounter in our moment-to-
moment lives are ambiguous in some significant way.96 Is the
tree in the distance an apple tree or a pear tree? Is her smile
friendly or fake? Was that push playful or hostile? Interpreting
these ambiguous phenomena is one of the central projects of daily
life, and accessible schemas exert a profound influence over this
interpretative project. When we encounter an ambiguous
stimulus, "[tihe interpretation that is chosen can be determined
simply by whatever applicable concept happens to be accessible
at the moment."97
Just as an accessible knowledge structure can serve as a
scanning pattern in the perceptual process, it can also become a
person's "interpretive frame."98 When a schema is accessible,
ambiguous stimuli may be "assimilated" to it, meaning that
we interpret the item in ways consistent with the schema.9
9' See id.
92 See id.
93 It also appears that chronically accessible goals can preconsciously suppress
the activation of undesirable associated knowledge. See id. at 376-77.
KUNDA, supra note 2, at 19.
9 See id. (discussing the "interpretive fumction" of knowledge structures).
See id.; see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 257.
97 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 389 (emphasis omitted).
' Id.; see KUNDA, supra note 2, at 24.
MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 389; see id. at 393.
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Thus, for example, the symbol "1" is seen as a lowercase "L"
rather than the number "one" if the schema for letters has
been activated. 100  Likewise, "we interpret the behavior of
others ... with the aid of what is most accessible to us";10 1
"perceivers assimilate judgments of people they observe to match
accessible constructs."0 2 Thus, in one well-known study, subjects
were given different impressions regarding the socio-economic
status of a young girl-some were led to believe she was wealthy,
while others were led to believe she was poor-and then shown a
tape of the girl performing ambiguously on a test.0 3 When they
were asked to assess her performance, subjects who had been led
to believe she was wealthy rated her performance as above
average, while those who believed she was poor rated her
performance as below average."°  Their interpretations of the
events they perceived were influenced by the schema (rich or
poor) they were induced to apply. 0 5
Not surprisingly then, incidental primes can significantly
influence our interpretations of other people's behavior. 0 6  A
push is seen as hostile (rather than playful) if the schema for
hostility has been made accessible by exposure to hostility primes
(such as a prior encounter with a hostile person, subliminal
exposure to words or images associated with hostility, words
associated with a stereotype that entails aggression, or the
presence of a gun).107 Similarly, subjects shown a handful of
words associated with recklessness are more likely to interpret
the protagonist of a story as reckless, while those shown a
handful of words associated with adventurousness are more
likely to interpret the protagonist as adventurous, 0 8 and seeing a
100 FiSKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 99 (discussing this example).
101 MOSKOWITZ, Pupra note 2, at 396; see FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 257.
102 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 409.
103 See id. at 179.
'04 See id.
105 See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 124; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 179.
106 See KUNDA, supra note 2, at 22, 47.
107 See id. at 22, 47-48, 281-82; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 407; FISKE &
TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 258-60 (noting hostility priming effects of subliminal
exposure to words associated with stereotypes for African Americans, seeing a
picture of Bobby Knight, and seeing a gun on a table). Similar results have been
found when subjects interpret other sorts of ambiguously hostile behavior (such as
refusing to pay the rent until the apartment has been painted). See KUNDA, supra
note 2, at 282.
108 See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 258.
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missing child poster makes us more likely to see an "ambiguous
adult-child interaction" as a "kidnapping."10 9 "Trivial exposure
to these concepts" shapes subjects' interpretations of the
protagonist's behavior. 110 In the same fashion, priming emotions
can influence interpretation of ambiguous stimuli"' so that a
person who is scared is likely to interpret muffled noises as
frightening ones,'12 and a person who has been exposed to
words suggesting anger becomes more likely to perceive
ambiguous stimuli "in a manner consistent with" anger."'
Moreover, once the concept has been activated, it makes us less
likely to spot more fitting categorizations: Once we have
interpreted a person's behavior as hostile, we become less likely
to see it as playfully rambunctious (even if that is the correct
interpretation)." 4 "[T]he likelihood that a sensory input will be
categorized in terms of a given category is not only a matter of fit
between sensory input and category specifications. It depends
also on the accessibility of a category." 115
Primed schemas sometimes have a different sort of influence
on interpretation: Rather than leading to assimilation, they lead
to contrast. 116 When contrast occurs, stimuli are interpreted as
different from, rather than similar to, the accessible concept. 117
In particular, if the primed concept is "extreme""' (or, perhaps,
narrow and distinctive)," 9 the primed concept may come to
function as a "standard of comparison" against which ambiguous
stimuli pale. 20 Thus, priming "Gandhi" may lead us to interpret
109 Id. at 259.
110 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 409; see also, e.g., KUNDA, supra note 2, at 23.
More complexly, priming one category can lead to "category competition" that
preconsciously suppresses information associated with another. For example,
triggering the "man" stereotype for Joe may suppress associations with the
"librarian" stereotype, skewing our interpretations of his conduct. See MOSKOWITZ,
supra note 2, at 377.
I" See KUNDA, supra note 2, at 23; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 398.
112 See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 397-98.
13 Id. at 398.
114 See id. at 386.
115 Id. at 386-87 (quoting BRUNER, GOODNOW & AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 132).
116 See generally id. at 390, 417-30.
117 See id. at 417.
11 See id. at 418-20.
119 See id. at 427.
120 Id. at 418, 419-20. In fact, the contrast effect is even more complicated.
There is some evidence that some sorts of concepts (exemplars) produce contrast
effects when they are "extreme," while others (abstract traits) produce more contrast
when they are moderate. See id. at 428-29. Moreover, placing subjects under
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other people as more hostile than we otherwise would have; with
Gandhi in mind, most people's hostility stands out.121  By the
same token, priming "Dracula" may lead us to interpret other
people as less hostile than we otherwise would have. 22
Chronically accessible concepts also have an important
influence on how we interpret the things we notice. 23 Broadly
speaking, we are likely to assimilate ambiguous phenomena to
chronically accessible categories, even at the expense of other
less accessible but more fitting categories. 124  The chronically
accessible category is more easily activated; fewer feature
matches are necessary.' 21 As Moskowitz suggests, the person
raised on an apple farm is more likely to see the far-away tree as
an apple tree than the person raised in the city: For the apple
farmer, the apple tree category is chronically accessible and
guides interpretation of ambiguous trees. 26 Along the same
lines, "[i]f the trait 'hostility' is chronically accessible"-as it
might be for someone raised in an abusive household, a
militaristic society, or a street gang culture-"we will be quicker
to label [an ambiguous] behavior as hostile." 27 In the same vein,
research on depression highlights how pervasive the interpretive
influence of a chronically accessible schema can be. On one
account of depression, the depressed person is someone for whom
cognitive load further alters the distribution of contrast effects (eliminating contrast
effects with trait primes). See id. at 429.
121 See id. at 420.
122 See id. at 418. The contrast effect may also arise when a person becomes
aware that a concept may be biasing and attempts to correct for the bias. See id. at
422.
These sorts of accessibility effects on interpretation-assimilation and contrast-are
most likely to come into play when the primed person encounters an ambiguous
stimulus. See id. at 412, 435 (noting that the stimulus being judged must be
somewhat ambiguous and open to interpretation).
123 See KUNDA, supra note 2, at 24.
124 See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 386. Moskowitz quotes Bruner's
formulation: "The greater the accessibility of a category, (a) the less the input
necessary for a categorization to occur in terms of this category, (b) the wider the
range of characteristics that will be 'accepted' as fitting the category in question,
(c) the more likely that categories that provide a better or equally good fit.., will be




127 Id.; see also KUNDA, supra note 2, at 24 (providing analogous examples
involving "masculinity" and "shyness").
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a "depressive schema" is chronically accessible. 2 ' The depressive
schema contains an array of "negative beliefs and explanations
for events."129  Because these beliefs and explanations are
chronically accessible, they frequently color not just what the
depressed person perceives (as the "lens of a negative self-
concept"), but also how he interprets what he perceives, so that
"[he] concludes that the world is a negative and threatening place
where failure predominates." 3 °
Again, the schematic cognition that is so essential to our
navigation of the world also profoundly influences our
construction of that world, steering our interpretations of
ambiguous phenomena in significant and unexpected ways.
c. Conduct
It should not be surprising then, that accessible
knowledge structures have also been shown to influence conduct
itself. "[We... produce social behavior, with the aid of what is
most accessible to us."131
A colorful array of experiments illustrates this phenomenon.
Subjects shown pictures of dogs were more likely to act loyally in
a subsequent scenario than subjects shown pictures of cats:
Through association, the dog picture primed the concept of
loyalty, and priming the concept of loyalty resulted in loyal
behavior 132 (presumably, through its influence on perception,
interpretation, motivation, and other constituents of conduct). In
another experiment, some subjects were exposed to achievement-
related words (buried in a word puzzle), while others were
128 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 381-82 (attributing this account of depression
to Aaron T. Beck); see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 265 (discussing the
relationship between "chronic processing of negative social categories regarding
oneself" and depression); KUNDA, supra note 2, at 298-99 (discussing schematic
aspects of depression).
129 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 382.
130 Id. A related theory holds that people may develop optimistic or pessimistic
"explanatory styles," which are "chronic tendencies to rely excessively on some
dimensions of the causal calculus" when seeking to understand events. In the throes
of a pessimistic explanatory style, a person will be more likely to see himself as the
cause of a bad event and to see the causes of bad events as global and permanent.
Such an explanatory style might be associated with "chronic accessibility for
negative information .... There is a triggering of negative beliefs, concepts, and
traits, and this spreads through the associative network, providing a web of
negativity for interpreting the meaning of events." Id. at 382-85.
1"l Id. at 396.
131 Id. at 395.
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exposed to affiliation-related words; the subjects exposed to
achievement-related words acted in a more achievement-
oriented way and achieved more on a subsequent task.133
Exposure to images of a professor have an analogous effect,
while encountering images of a soccer hooligan lead to worse
performance. 13 Subjects are more likely to behave in a hostile or
aggressive manner when they have looked at an exclamation
point (as compared to subjects who looked at a line with a dot
above it);13 5 viewing a picture of Bobby Knight (the notoriously
aggressive college basketball coach) "primes" aggression and
makes the person more likely to behave aggressively; 136
subliminal exposure to pictures of African Americans increases
the hostility subjects show the experimenter; 13v and exposing
subjects to words associated with rudeness, embedded in jumbled
sentences, leads them to act more rudely.138 Subliminal exposure
to words associated with competition leads people to behave more
competitively and to betray each other in favor of self-interested
behavior in "Prisoner's Dilemma" scenarios. 139 For some men,
exposure to words associated with power increases attraction to
women present. 40 And exposure to ideas associated with old age
causes subjects to walk more slowly.' As these experiments
suggest, it can seem as though we "automatically behave in line
with traits cued by recent experiences."1 42
More subtly, subjects were more likely to solve the "Duncker
candle problem" (which requires subjects to affix a candle to a
wall using a box of tacks) if they were primed with phrases like
"carton and eggs" than if they were primed with concepts like
133 Id. at 399.
131 Id. at 540.
13 Kees van den Bos, Jaap Ham, E. Allan Lind, Marieke Simonis, Wiljo J. van
Essen, Mark Rijpkema, Justice and the Human Alarm System: The Impact of
Exclamation Points and Flashing Lights on the Justice Judgment Process, 44 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL., 201, 207-10 (2008).
136 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 259.
137 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 282-83, 321 ("[M]ere exposure to an African
American face can suffice for other Americans to activate the construct of hostility,
which, in turn, can lead them to behave in a more hostile manner."). And all this can
take place automatically, without their realizing that they have even seen an
African American face. See id.
13 Id. at 270-72.
139 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 259-60; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 527.
140 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 285-87.
141 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 539.
142 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 303.
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"carton of eggs."143 The former prime made disaggregation
accessible, and disaggregation was essential to solving the
problem (removing the tacks from the box makes it possible to
tack the box to the wall as a platform for the candle). More
broadly, event schemas and scripts can significantly influence
how we act, fueling "mindless" scripted behavior in which scripts
are "automatically triggered" and "guid[e] the manner in which
people respond[ ."144
Schematic thinking, then, is not just a useful mechanism for
parsing floods of sensory input; it is also a mechanism that
influences cognition and conduct in distinctive and significant
ways. It has a profound influence on what information a person
registers and assimilates, on how she interprets complex or
ambiguous stimuli, on her motivations, and, ultimately, on what
she does.
C. Some Surprising Features of Schematic Cognition: Situation-
Dependence, Semi-Automation, and Social Construction
Our knowledge structures have further unexpected
ramifications for us. For one thing, schematic cognition
makes us surprisingly vulnerable to situational influences-
circumstantial stimuli, including seemingly inconsequential
stimuli, exert a surprising influence on what we see, think, and
do. For another thing, knowledge structures often exert their
influence in ways that have a semi-automatic quality-we are
unlikely to recognize and have difficulty controlling their
influence. Finally, knowledge structures tie us to our cultural
environment in a deep and powerful way-for many of our
knowledge structures are socially constructed.
1. Situation-Dependence
Schematic cognition's susceptibility to situational influence
is striking. As we have seen, knowledge structures influence
14 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 401; FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 260. The
experiment illustrates that it is possible to prime particular "mindsets" or "cognitive
orientation[s]" in a way that influences subsequent behavior. MOSKOWITZ, supra
note 2, at 400-01.
14 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 163. Of course, we can generally reflect on and
intercede in our own scripted behavior, but scripts may provide "default
value[s] ... that specif[y] how one.., behaves when nothing unusual is happening"
within the script-triggering situation. Id.
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cognition and conduct when they are made accessible. But
"[wihat is accessible in your mind is partly determined by what
you have been exposed to in your environment"145 and "will
change as we move from one situation to another and encounter
different stimuli that retrieve different concepts from memory." 46
Moreover, it does not take much to change what is accessible:
"[Cloncepts in our minds can be triggered by events in our
environment to which we have been incidentally exposed."'47 As
a result, because the frames we bring to perception and
interpretation are summoned and suppressed by incidental
environmental stimuli, and because those stimuli change from
situation to situation, our perceptual and interpretative frames
are perpetually subject to revision, as stimuli that bring up one
set of schema are supplanted by stimuli that bring up another.
In short, because our schemas influence us in profound ways, and
because our schemas are highly sensitive to environmental
stimuli, schematic cognition makes our perceptions, interpret-
ations, motivations, and conduct surprisingly vulnerable to
external influence.
The dynamics of chronic accessibility also entail significant
situation dependence. Which concepts are chronically accessible
is significantly influenced by our "prior interaction history with
stimuli." 48 If we live in a state in which public spaces or popular
media are saturated with national symbols, concepts associated
with that state will become chronically accessible. If our friends
are preoccupied with intellectual achievement or physical
appearance, concepts associated with intelligence or appearance
will be chronically accessible. 14 9 Cultural emphasis on certain
goals and values can produce in us auto-motives that become
chronically accessible too. 5' Thus, culture-local or general-can
have a significant influence on the menu of chronically accessible
concepts, and thus on our schematic cognition.
145 Id. at 391.
146 Id. at 396.
147 Id. at 406.
14 Id. at 357.
149 See id. at 379.
150 Id. at 361-62.
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2. Semi-Automation
This vulnerability is exacerbated by the difficulty we have
perceiving or controlling this influence.
Much of our schematic thinking has a semi-automatic
character-it happens without us knowing it and is difficult for
us to intervene in.151 One of the striking things about our use of
knowledge structures is how much the process occurs outside of
our consciousness, unnoticed and unmediated. 15 Categorization
can happen entirely automatically and need not involve any
conscious work: It "is the most ubiquitous and primitive
cognitive activity" and "can occur without conscious
awareness."153 Indeed, much of the time, categorization, and
knowledge structures "operate implicitly,"154 "springing to mind
effortlessly and silently."'1 55
Along the same lines, accessibility influences us in ways we
neither perceive nor control. For example, incidental stimuli can
impact us, and they can do so without our being aware that they
are doing so, 5 6 either because the priming stimuli itself is
unnoticed (because it is subliminal or seems inconsequential), or
because we do not realize that the priming stimulus has
influenced us. 157 "[T]he triggering of concepts can bias what you
think you see or hear and what concepts come to mind, without
your being aware of the influence these concepts have."58
Similarly, chronically accessible concepts can act as "filter[s]" for
scanning the world that "run on automatic pilot."5 9 We generally
do not recognize that they are influencing us: They "exert a
151 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 265-309 (automatic cognition generally).
152 Id. at 265, 266 ("[We simply do not have introspective access to many
processes.").
153 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 119 (attributing this view to Bruner).
151 Id. at 176.
115 Id. at 191.
156 See id. at 390.
167 See KUNDA, supra note 2, at 280.
Im MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 393.
159 Id. at 357; see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 265 ("[C]hronically




silent influence on our judgment and behavior"6 ' and "direct
social cognition and perception without our awareness."161
"Chronic concepts ... pick and select ... information from
the environment without our needing to ask them to do the job.
Much like breathing, the process occurs without conscious
monitoring."1 62 Along the same lines, when chronically accessible
concepts activate the perceptual defense dynamic, "decisions"
about which information will be "consciously detected and
attended" are being made "without conscious awareness."163 In
short, schematic thinking entails a range of automatic and semi-
automatic phenomena that influence our "judgments, feelings,
and behaviors " "1& and that tend to operate "outside our conscious
control," 65 such that we are "unable to control and monitor their
execution. "1 6 6
Finally, even when we are aware that an accessible concept
may be influencing us, we may find it difficult to control that
influence 16'-indeed, should we wish not to be influenced by a
particular concept, our vigilance against it may actually make it
more accessible (and thus more likely to influence us). 6
3. Social-Construction
As we have seen, our schemas are influenced by our
circumstances: Circumstances activate some schemas while
suppressing others, and, over the long term, circumstances make
some schemas chronically accessible. But certain circumstances
also influence schemas in a deeper way. In particular, social and
160 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 357; see also KUNDA, supra note 2, at 265
(noting unrecognized influences on "judgments and behavior").
161 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 357.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 374. Thus, "much of our perceptual experience takes place in the
preconscious and prior to our conscious awareness getting involved." Id. at 357.
Along the same lines, auto-motives can be "automatically initiated," without
consciousness, by "cues embedded in the context signaling that this context affords
one the opportunity to pursue chronically accessible goals." Id. at 360. "[C]hronic
goals lie in wait, and when appropriate contexts appear, these contexts trigger the
goals .... The goals' chronic state ... allows them to function ... automatically." Id.
16 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 287-88.
165 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 356.
166 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 266.
167 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 393-94 ("Can people help having
concepts ... triggered when [tasks involving exposure to primes] are performed?
Probably not.").
166 See KUNDA, supra note 2, at 299; see also MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 395.
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cultural circumstances play an important role in creating our
schemas.
So far, we have suggested that the menu of categories we use
to evaluate new stimuli are derived from prior knowledge-either
experiential or otherwise learned. But this glosses over a feature
of schematic thinking that will turn out to be significant for
moral and criminal responsibility: Our categories are often
socially constructed 169 or "socially shared."17 ° While one possible
explanation for the shared nature of certain categories is that
they are ones that naturally arise from encounters with the
physical reality.'71 A much more likely explanation is that
"categories are shared because they represent various theories
that people hold about the world."172 These theories, in turn, "are
taught to them by their culture.' 17 3  "In the great blooming,
buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out that what our
culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that
which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our
culture." 74
To illustrate this point, consider the Whorfian hypothesis,
according to which the different languages used by different
groups of people lead these groups to different observations and
evaluations of similar stimuli. 17  To cite a popular example,
individuals in a culture that has numerous classifications for
snow are likely to categorize snow-related phenomena differently
than individuals in a culture that only has one word for snow.
76
Along a different line, consider that there can be deep ideological
differences between cultures, and these deep differences
can influence how individuals categorize things and events.
177
169 FiSKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 120; KUNDA, supra note 2, at 542
("[D]ifferent cultures may give rise to different collective, culturally shared ways of
constructing, defining, and extracting meaning from situations."); MOSKOWITZ,
supra note 2, at 117-19, 168.
170 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 117, 168; see also KUNDA, supra note 2, 515-60
(surveying important cultural influence on social cognition).
171 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 117.
172 Id.; see also id. at 168.
171 Id. at 117; see also id. at 168; FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 120.
174 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 440 (quoting LIPPMANN, supra note 4, at 55).
175 Id. at 117.
176 Fiske and Taylor offer analogous examples (for example, some cultures have
words that convey the meaning associated with the term "bohemian," others do not).
FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 177.
177 See generally KUNDA, supra note 2, at 515-60; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at
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For example, a substantial body of research suggests that
some cultures can be meaningfully distinguished as either
individualist or collectivist and that members of these two kinds
of cultures categorize observed behavior in distinctive ways-
individualist culture generates individual and trait centered
categorizations of behavior, while collectivist culture generates
categorizations that revolve around social role, social pressure,
social obligations, and situation generally.17 Participants in an
individualist culture will check stimuli against a different menu
of categories than members of a collectivist culture. 179 Or, to give
yet another familiar example, cultures notoriously adopt
stereotypes-race and gender stereotypes being the most obvious
examples-and these stereotypes influence categorization
at a basic level.' 80  The categories used by individuals in
different cultures will differ tremendously, depending on
which stereotypes their cultures transmit and depending on
which features are included in those culturally-transmitted
stereotypes.' 8l  As a result, categorization influenced by
stereotype will vary significantly from culture to culture.
8 2
D. An Illustration: Stereotyping
So far, we have described the basic (and sometimes
surprising) phenomena that constitute schematic cognition. To
flesh out the picture, this Section uses the familiar phenomenon
of stereotyping to illustrate how schematic cognition works in
real and common human experience.
Broadly speaking, stereotypes 8 3 are schemas for groups of
people."s They are "expectancies about a social group" 8 5 that are
178 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 118, 168. See generally KUNDA, supra note 2,
517-49.
179 See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 118. See generally KUNDA, supra note 2, at
349-56 (describing how ideological differences in northern and southern United
States regarding honor and violence influence perceptions, interpretations, and
conduct).
180 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 120-21; see also MEDIN, ROSS & MARKMAN,
supra note 2, at 322 (noting some subcultural variations in stereotypical thinking).
181 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 557; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 120-21.
182 FiSKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 177 ("[Tlhere are important social and
cultural differences in schemas. Content clearly differs ....") (emphasis omitted);
KUNDA, supra note 2, at 557 ("Each culture may bestow its members with distinctive
ways of making sense of people.").
1 See generally KUNDA, supra note 2, at 313-93; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2,
438-79.
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comprised of "beliefs about the probability that particular traits,
features, characteristics, opinions, and behaviors will be observed
in those people at some point during our (or someone else's)
future interaction with them." 6 They generally also include
attitudes or affects-feelings associated with the stereotyped
group.187 And while they are sometimes pernicious, stereotyping
"is not always negative, and... can be functional.""s  Indeed,
"we have expectancies about every person with whom we
interact," such that "no observation, inference, or interaction is
free from the influence of [these] expectancies."8 9 Stereotypes
then, are among the most important and ubiquitous examples of
schemas.
Like schematic thinking generally, stereotyping is a device
for managing information overload-"a functional response to our
simply being unable to process each individual as a complex and
unique stimulus." 190 Stereotypes facilitate quick and efficient
identification of the person stereotyped, support assumptions
about her features, enable us to predict her behavior, and enable
us to plan our own behavior accordingly.' 9' When we encounter a
member of the stereotyped group (or "the symbolic equivalence of
their presence"' 92 ), "a host of beliefs and expectancies associated
with the stereotype should be triggered.' 93 We draw on these
beliefs and expectancies to understand and make predictions
11 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 315 (stereotypes as knowledge structures);
MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 440, 444, 455 (stereotypes as "top-down/schema-driven
thinking").
185 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 439.
186 Id.; see also KUNDA, supra note 2, at 314-15.
187 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 315; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 444. These
attitudes or affects need not have a clear or logical relation to the beliefs a person
has about a stereotyped group (that is, attitude and belief need not be connected). Id.
at 444, 448 (describing "[alversive racism ... in which people who truly uphold
beliefs that oppose the old stereotypes are also latently holding negative feelings
toward the group. These feelings persist despite the change in beliefs and the
conscious rejection of the stereotypes.") (emphasis omitted).
18 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 439.
189 Id. at 438-39.
190 Id. at 442; see also KUNDA, supra note 2, at 316 (stereotyping frees cognitive
resources for other cognitive tasks).
19, See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 441-42. Stereotypes "allow[] us to
categorize and make predictions about the members of [a] category when forming
impressions." Id. at 440.
192 Id. at 480.
193 Id. at 441. We are especially likely to do so under cognitive load. See KUNDA,
supra note 2, at 359.
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about the stereotyped person. We are using them just as we use
any other schema.
Not surprisingly then, primed194 or chronically accessible
stereotypes can have profound influence on our cognition and
conduct. An accessible stereotype influences "social cognition
from the earliest, preconscious stages of characterization and
categorization to the more deliberate and effortful stages of
impression formation."" 5 It influences perception, "impos[ing] a
certain character on the data of our senses before the data
reach the intelligence" 196 and skewing what "grabs [our]
attention."1 9v  Indeed, like other schemas, stereotypes bring
confirmation bias with them; we "cling" to them, and we process
"[iinformation... in [a] manner that confirms the existing
stereotype,"1 98 while "contradictory evidence is likely to be
rejected" 99 or "underutilize[d],"2°° and "evidence conflicting with
a stereotype may be distorted so it is seen as confirming the
stereotype. 20 1
And just as accessible schemas influence interpretation of
ambiguous phenomena generally, stereotypes influence how we
interpret the behavior of other human beings.2 °2 As Moskowitz
notes, "[i]ost [human] behaviors are open to interpretation" 20 3 _
a shove can be interpreted as hostile or playful, a smile as
friendly or mocking. A stereotype "can... determin[e] which one
of the many potential ways a behavior could be categorized will
be the one used to describe the behavior,"20 4 for "[w]e apply
194 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 443-44.
195 Id. at 439, 455 (noting connection to accessibility).
196 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 440 (quoting LIPPMANN, supra note 4, at 65).
"' Id. at 455.
198 Id. at 455; see also id. at 472.
'9 Id. at 479.
200 Id. at 484.
201 Id. at 479. "Stereotype-congruent behaviors... get attributed to a target
person's stable personality, whereas incongruent behaviors are attributed to the
situation," such that there is no need to alter the stereotype for the group. Id. at 486.
We also engage in other maneuvers in order to preserve our stereotypes, such as
attributing counter-stereotypical behavior to situational influences, id., and creating
"subtypes" for group members who seem to deviate from the stereotype, id. at 472-
74, 479 (noting subtypes function by positing that the stereotype remains generally
true and that counter-stereotype examples merely represent a deviant sub-group).
202 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 316; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 455.
203 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 460.
204 Id. at 460; KUNDA, supra note 2, at 346-47 ("[Sleveral ... studies... have
shown that stereotypes associated with race, social class, or profession can lend
different meanings to the same ambiguous behaviors.").
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stereotypes more readily than other, competing explanations for
behavior."20 5  Thus, if the stereotype we apply to a person
characterizes her as hostile or unreliable, we will interpret her
ambiguous behavior as hostile or unreliable.2 6 If a stereotype is
primed-for example, by encountering a member of the
stereotype, or hearing words associated with the stereotype, or
overhearing a racial slur-evaluations of group members are
steered toward the stereotype. 20 7  "[P]eople are more likely to
make an inference that confirms an expectancy they already
hold" about another person's traits.208
This is why "people label the same behavior differently,
depending on the group membership of the person who performs
it,"209 as a pair of striking experiments show. In Duncan's
classic experiment,210 subjects were asked to watch two people
talking, and to evaluate their behavior at various points in
the conversation. At one evaluation point, one conversant
shoved the other. Evaluations were strongly influenced by
racial stereotypes: When a Black conversant shoved a White
conversant, subjects characterized the shove as violent 75% of
the time, but when a white conversant shoved a black
conversant, only 17% of subjects labeled the shove as violent,
while 42% construed it as playful.21' In another experiment,212
subjects were presented a court transcript setting out the case
against a defendant. In some versions the defendant was white,
while in others he was Puerto Rican. In some, he was accused of
205 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 479.
206 See KUNDA, supra note 2, at 319-20 (describing research showing that
priming a stereotype for the African-American race, which includes a hostility
component, led to interpreting ambiguously hostile conduct as hostile); id. at 347
("[E]xposure to an African American individual may spontaneously bring to mind
traits such as aggressive or criminal which then influence the interpretation of
ambiguous behaviors.").
207 See, e.g., FIsKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 258.
208 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 460. Stereotypes cast a "stereotypic light" on
the people we encounter. Id. at 455.
10 Id. at 465; see also KUNDA, supra note 2, at 346-49 ("[Olur stereotypes can
lead us to interpret identical behaviors, traits, and group memberships quite
differently when these pertain to differently stereotyped individuals.").
210 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 346-47; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 464.
211 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 464; see also KUNDA, supra note 2, at 346-47.
Similar results have been found in scenarios in which one child is seen taking an
eraser from another and in which one colleague is sarcastic to another. See FISKE &
TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 123-24.
212 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 467-68 (describing a 1985 experiment
conducted by Bodenhausen and Wyer).
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a white collar crime, in others a battery. Subjects were more
likely to find the defendant guilty if his crime fit his group
stereotype (for example, white defendant/white collar crime;
Puerto Rican defendant/battery). Moreover, subjects saw
defendants as more responsible for crimes that fit their
stereotypes, and thus imposed more severe punishment in these
cases.213 Subjects had relied on stereotypes rather than fully
scrutinizing the information in the transcript.214 Stereotypes
influenced their interpretations in a fundamental way.
Stereotypes also illustrate some of the most surprising
features of schematic thinking. As we have already seen,
much of schematic cognition occurs without our realization.
Stereotyping illustrates this nicely.215 The processes associated
with stereotyping-activation and application of the stereotype-
"can occur rather effortlessly and mindlessly (without conscious
awareness or intent)."216 As a result, "stereotyping often proceeds
without our awareness, biasing us in ways we would never
suspect,"21 7 and "the process of having the affect or attitude
associated with that person triggered occurs immediately and
without awareness. 2 8
Likewise, as we have also seen, schematic thinking can be
resistant to conscious intervention-that is, it can be hard to
control.2"9 This problem has been extensively documented in the
context of stereotypes. Members of a given culture will generally
be exposed to and learn that culture's stereotypes, and once this
has happened, the stereotype may influence cognition even in
someone who has rejected the stereotype.220  "[G]roup
membership[s] ... are often clearly marked by physical features
that we cannot help detecting as part of basic and preconscious
213 Id. at 467.
214 Id. at 468 ("[Participants] processed heuristically, paying no more attention
to relevant information ... than they did to irrelevant information ... [and ignored]
information inconsistent with a stereotype.").
215 See, e.g., KUNDA, supra note 2, at 319-20 (describing Devine's 1989
experiment in which priming with stereotype-related words activated the construct
of hostility without the participant's awareness).
216 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 480.
217 Id. at 442; see also KUNDA, supra note 2, at 347.
218 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 444.
219 There is reason to believe that this first step in stereotyping-"stereotype
activation-is "effortless," "mindless," and "inevitable." Id. at 480.
" KUNDA, supra note 2, at 318-19.
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"221perceptual processes. Detecting group membership is
"sufficient for the stereotype to be triggered when we encounter a
member of a stereotyped group."222 As a result, stereotypes can
become accessible "even though we consciously reject the
stereotype"223 and can have a profound influence on our cognition
even if we disapprove of them.224 Even if a person rejects a
"cultural stereotype," her "knowledge of that cultural stereotype
does not dissipate.... [Pleople who find the ... stereotype
offensive.., still have the knowledge of that stereotype stored in
memory and can easily have that stereotype triggered."225 Thus,
"regardless of whether we have egalitarian values, anti-
stereotypic personal beliefs, and a dedication to fairness, a
stereotype can still be triggered without our knowing it, simply
because we 'know' the stereotype."226  Indeed, attempts to
suppress stereotypes can have "ironic side effects" 227: "[T]hought
suppression.., leads to an even greater incidence of that
thought,"228  as thoughts we attempt to suppress become
221 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 441.
222 Id. In one view, "[tihe mere presence of a group member will automatically
activate the concepts with which the group has been.., associated.
Stereotypes ... must be triggered whenever we categorize a person as belonging to a
group-the triggering is inevitable." Id. at 452. "[T]he triggering of the concept [by
encountering the member of the stereotyped group] should lead to spreading
activation, so that a host of beliefs and expectancies associated with the stereotype
should be triggered." Id. at 441.
223 Id.
224 KUNDA, supra note 2, at 327-28 (describing Devine's thesis that activation of
the negative stereotype is automatic and inevitable, regardless of one's personal
beliefs); id. at 334-35 (describing experimental evidence showing that "when primed
with the information that is directly related to the negative stereotype, all people
will automatically activate this stereotype, regardless of their prejudice"); see also
MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 440-42. "[Elven if we are not explicitly attempting to
categorize a person, each person we meet is quickly and quietly placed into some
primitive and broad 'boxfl.' "Id. at 441. "Once we have placed the person in a box, an
inescapable part of this categorization process is the heightened accessibility of all
the information in that box, including that which we have... rejected." Id.
225 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2 at 506; see also KUNDA, supra note 2, at 318.
226 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 451. "[1]fit is triggered without our knowing it,
we can be biased by its accessibility even if we reject the stereotype." Id. at 451.
Indeed, even when a person is "consciously working quite hard to" be "egalitarian,
fair, and nonbiased," prejudiced attitudes may "comeD out 'through the cracks.'" Id.
at 448.
27 Id. at 499; see KUNDA, supra note 2, at 345-46.
228 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 499 (emphasis omitted); KUNDA, supra note 2,
345-46. "In order not to think a specific thought, one must constantly monitor the
mind to make sure that the unwanted thought is not entering consciousness. This
creates the unusual demand to hold in mind, at some (preconscious) level, the very
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"hyperaccessible" over time. 2 9  This is not to say that stereo-
typic thinking is entirely beyond our control, 230 but in real
life, "conditions" typically "undermine" the kind of "effortful
processing" necessary to overcome the generally invisible and
semi-automatic stereotyping processes.231
Finally, stereotyping is a powerful illustration of the social
construction of our schemas. As we have seen, cultures
notoriously adopt stereotypes for groups like "men" and "whites,"
and these stereotypes influence categorization at a basic level.232
Of course, stereotypes can include information learned through
personal experience with an individual or a group,233 but
stereotypes can also have deep roots in social context.234
Stereotypes contain the features "that our culture has taught
us a particular social group is likely to possess."235 We learn
them, in part, from "things others have told us about the
individual/group in question,"236 from "various socializing agents
within the culture" including "parents, teachers, religion,
friends, the Internet, TV, etc."237 "This process [of stereotype
inculcation] begins as soon as we are able to understand speech,
even before we understand abstract concepts ... and continues
throughout life."238 In short, the stereotypes used by individuals
in different cultures will differ tremendously depending on
which stereotypes their cultures transmit.239 They are socially
constructed.
thought that is not to enter the mind," making the "unwanted thoughts... more
accessible." MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 499-500.
229 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 500-01.
230 "[The triggering of a stereotype may be easy, effortless, unintended, and
likely to occur for most people. But it is not inevitable." Id. at 511.
221 Id. at 512.
232 See id. at 120-22.
1 Id. at 438, 452.
23 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 122.
235 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 440.
2 Id. at 439.
237 Id. at 438. "Stereotypes ... are culturally shared beliefs transmitted to all of
us in a culture through socialization forces (for example, parents, media, peers,
teachers)." Id. at 452; see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 122 ("[Alutomatic
stereotypic reactions to race categories are equally characteristic of high and low
prejudice people (perhaps by virtue of both living with the culture's
stereotypes) . . ").
m MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 452.
239 Id. at 120-21; MEDIN, ROSS & MARKMAN, supra note 2, at 321-22 (noting
cultural influences on stereotyping).
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In these respects, stereotyping is a vivid and suggestive
illustration of several features of schematic cognition. Like our
other knowledge structures, stereotypes can exert significant
influence on our perception, interpretation, memory, and
conduct; their influence is itself highly susceptible to
environmental triggers; we are generally unaware of and bad at
controlling their effects; and we inherit them from the culture
that surrounds us. Seeing these features at work in stereotyping
should highlight the profound and potentially troubling role that
schematic cognition plays in our moral lives, for here schematic
cognition is implicated in the deepest way in our thoughts,
feelings, and conduct pertaining to other people.
E. In Sum
Of course, it is not surprising to discover that human
cognition does not incorporate and evenly weigh every item of
data our senses bring us. We do not have unlimited processing
capacity, so a system of triage is necessary. Even so, the
particular triage system we employ is surprising in some of its
details. Here, I have collected some of those surprising details,
and I suggest that they can usefully be subsumed under the
heading "schematic psychology."
For the purposes of this Article, the salient features of
schematic psychology are:
" We use schemas and related knowledge structures to
organize our information about the world (including
schemas for objects, people, events, and relationships).
" When accessible, such knowledge structures significantly
influence what we perceive and how we interpret what we
perceive (generally by steering us to perceptions and
interpretations that resonate with and reinforce the
accessible knowledge structure).
" Accessible schemas influence our feelings, attitudes, wants,
and values-in short, our motivations.
* Accessible schemas influence our conduct.
* Schema accessibility is contingent on circumstantial primes
(including seemingly inconsequential and even subliminal
stimuli).
* Schema accessibility is contingent on chronic stimulation.
* Schematic cognition is generally hard for us to control
(because we are generally unaware of its influence and have
limited success interceding against that influence).
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* Schematic cognition is highly susceptible to cultural
influences because cultural institutions (1) generate
schemas for us; and (2) chronically stimulate some of our
schemas.
Schematic psychology then, shows that we perceive and
interpret people and events in our world in strange and
unexpected ways. The next Part of this Article turns to one of
the most fundamental questions these startling discoveries raise
for the law: If schematic psychology paints an accurate picture of
human cognition, are we justified in holding human actors
responsible for their criminal acts?
IIl. SCHEMATIC PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY:
Two CHALLENGES
Building on Part II's overview of schematic psychology, this
Part contends that schematic psychology can fund two sorts of
challenges to conventional accounts of criminal responsibility. 40
Section A sets out an internal challenge. This internal
challenge proceeds by using schematic psychology to show that
human actors sometimes fail to satisfy a conventional
prerequisite for responsibility. The prerequisite at issue is a
facet of moral sensitivity, having to do with sensitivity to morally
significant facts. Schematic psychology, I will argue, shows that
this facet of our moral sensitivity is impaired more often and
more profoundly than we generally imagine, and thus that
responsibility is absent more often than we realize.
Section B takes a broader view, offering an external
challenge. This Section argues that taking schematic psychology
seriously should catalyze doubts about the project of attributing
responsibility to individual human actors itself. The research on
schematic cognition suggests that our conduct is influenced in
deep and unexpected ways by cultural and environmental
influences, both circumstantial and constitutive. If this is right,
then holding us responsible for our conduct raises significant
fairness problems-problems which undercut the reactive
attitudes associated with holding individuals responsible.
240 The challenge to criminal responsibility is derivative-it takes moral
responsibility to be a prerequisite for criminal responsibility.
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A. The Internal Challenge
Schematic psychology paints an unexpected and startling
picture of human cognition. One reason why this picture is
startling is that it suggests that we are not as sensitive to moral
considerations as we generally think we are. For example, due to
schematic blind spots and biases, we often fail to register morally
significant facts in our environments: 241 we do not recognize that
a bump is accidental (not hostile); we do not see that a black
object is a wallet (not a gun); we fail to note that a man curled on
the sidewalk is in peril (not sleeping off a drink). We fail to
register these facts even though they are available to our senses
and for reasons that seem arbitrary and unconnected to our
desires, beliefs, or values.
This amendment to conventional psychology requires us to
reevaluate our status as responsible actors. On the conventional
view, moral sensitivity is essential to moral responsibility.
Because schematic psychology shows that schematic cognition
impairs the perceptual or empirical facet of our moral sensitivity,
it calls into question our moral responsibility. And because it is
generally held that an actor cannot be criminally responsible
unless he is morally responsible, it follows that criminal
responsibility, too, is threatened.
1. The Role of Sensitivity to Morally Significant Facts in Moral
Responsibility
There is, of course, a long-standing and lively debate about
the characteristics a person must have in order to be considered a
morally responsible actor. In recent years, one influential family
of theories-which I will call reasons-responsiveness theories-
has suggested that morally responsible agency has two
fundamental components.242 One is an "executive" or volitional
component-the ability to act in accord with one's reasons. The
other is a "cognitive" or intellectual component-the ability to
recognize reasons for acting, including moral reasons. This
second component, sometimes described as "moral sensitivity,"
241 Even though those facts are available to our senses (as the examples in the
text suggest).
242 See JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL
(1998); R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (1994); and




entails, among other things, sensitivity to morally significant
facts about one's environment.
The central claim of the reasons-responsiveness theory is
that a responsible actor should be able to recognize and act upon
moral reasons. Susan Wolf says that an actor is responsible if
she can "do the right thing for the right reasons," meaning she
has "the power to recognize" and "the ability to act in accordance
with.., the True and the Good."24 R. Jay Wallace says she must
have the capacity for reflective self-control, a capacity that
entails both the ability to grasp moral reasons and the ability
to act in accord with those reasons.244 Manuel Vargas holds
that the "basic structure of responsible agency" includes "a
set of capacities to recognize or detect moral considerations
in the considered circumstance, and to appropriately govern
one's conduct in light of them."24  Fischer and Ravizza's
influential account breaks reasons-responsiveness down even
more meticulously.246 In their view, a person is only morally
responsible for an act if the act is produced by a "moderate
reasons-responsiveness" mechanism 247 that the actor identifies
with or owns.248 Such a mechanism is moderately reasons-
responsive if it is "regularly receptive to reasons" (including some
moral reasons) and "at least weakly reactive" to those reasons.249
Being receptive to reasons means having the "cognitive power" to
recognize reasons for action when they appear,250 a power with
both perceptual and evaluative facets. 251  A "weakly" reasons-
243 WOLF, supra note 242, at 71; see also id. at 70-78, 87-88.
24 WALLACE, supra note 242, at 7, 155-66.
245 Manuel Vargas, Situationism and Moral Responsibility 6 (version 1.26n)
(Dec. 16, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
24 See generally FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 242.
247 Id. at 62. In typical cases, we act on a mechanism that can be described as
our practical reason, but Fischer and Ravizza's model recognizes that we might
actually or theoretically act as the result of other mechanisms (for example, hypnotic
commands or surgically implanted, externally controlled decision-forcing devices). It
is critical to their view, however, that we evaluate an actor's responsibility for any
given act by evaluating the reasons-responsiveness of the mechanism that actually
produced the act, rather than that of the agent as a whole.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 81.
250 Id. at 75.
251 Id. at 71. This ability is said to entail both perceptual/epistemic and
evaluative/reflective components. It involves recognition of facts about the world,
effective instrumental reasoning, and the capacity to evaluate reasons prudentially
and morally. Id. at 69-73.
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receptive mechanism may recognize only one or a few such
reasons to act, but moral responsibility requires at least a
"regularly" reasons-receptive mechanism, meaning one that
recognizes a coherent pattern of intelligible reasons including at
least some moral reasons.252 "[R]eactivity to reasons" means
having the "executive power"2 53 to translate reasons into action.
Moral responsibility requires at least a weakly reasons-reactive
mechanism, meaning a mechanism that would translate a reason
for action into a consistent action in at least one case.254
While these accounts differ from each other in important
ways, they have in common a requirement that the actor posses
some degree of moral sensitivity. The actor must have "the
power to recognize the True and the Good";2 55 she must be able to
grasp moral reasons;2 6 she must act on a "mechanism" that is at
least "'regularly' receptive to reasons."257 A person who lacks
this sort of sensitivity has a disability so fundamental that it is
commonly equated with mental illness-either delusional
psychosis 25 or sociopathy-and may excuse him from moral
responsibility.
Moral sensitivity can be broken down into subsidiary
components. As Vargas suggests, moral sensitivity is actually a
congeries of related capacities to recognize a "highly varied"
collection of phenomena. 9  One facet of moral sensitivity is
evaluative (or reflective) and might be described as the capacity
to see "the nature of right and wrong."260 This is the capacity
that enables some people to see, for example, that "other persons
are ends in themselves."261  It is involved in the agent's
judgments about the significance of the phenomena in his
252 Id. at 70-71; id. at 66 (must recognize understandable reasons); id. at 73
(must have "an understandable pattern of reasons-recognition, minimally grounded
in reality"); id. at 76-81 (must recognize coherent pattern of moral reasons).
253 Id. at 75. The capacity at issue has alternately and variously been described
as a volitional, control, self-governance, or motivational capacity.
254 Id. at 62, 69.
255 WOLF, supra note 242, at 71.
26 WALLACE, supra note 242, at 12-13.
257 FISCHER & RAvizzA, supra note 242, at 71 (emphasis omitted).
258 Id. at 41.
119 Vargas, supra note 245, at 6. Victor Tadros's catalog of capacities required for
moral responsibility suggests the same thing. Tadros also suggests the distinction
between the "epistemic" and the "evaluative" facets of responsibility. VICTOR
TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 55-56 (2007).
260 Vargas, supra note 245, at 6.
261 Id. at 7.
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environment. Another facet is perceptual (or epistemic) and
might be described as the capacity to "judge the morally relevant
features of situations"26 2 or to register "facts about the
circumstances in which an agent is considering what to do.2 63 To
be a morally responsible agent, "[olne must.., be able to attain a
clear and accurate view of the morally relevant features of the
situation in which one is acting. "264 This is the capacity that
enables some people to register that "someone is in emotional
pain"265 or to recognize a "spouse's emotions."266 It has to do with
whether the agent registers those phenomena in the first place
267
and seems to be implicated in Fischer and Ravizza's observation
that the morally responsible agent must have"a certain kind
of sensitivity to external reality."268  His "connection
to the world is crucial to his moral responsibility .... [He]
must be... responsive to reasons presented by the
world .... [CIhanges in the external world must be reflected in
changes in the agent."2 69 Thus, moral sensitivity actually entails
more than one sort of sensitivity and includes not just the ability
to see moral reasons, but also the ability to recognize facts
relevant to the application of those moral reasons to particular
situations .270
262 WALLACE, supra note 242, at 169.
263 Vargas, supra note 245, at 6. Vargas makes the very useful points that
"sensitivity to moral considerations is not a unified phenomenon," and that "[in]oral
considerations may be constituted by or generated from as diverse things as affective
states, propositional content, situational awareness, and so on." Id.
264 WALLACE, supra note 242, at 169.
2' Vargas, supra note 245, at 7.
266 Id. at 9.
267 See FISCHER & RAvIZZA, supra note 242, at 69-73 (discussing the receptive
condition of moderate reasons-responsiveness).
268 Id. at 253.
269 Id. at 252.
270 See, e.g., WALLACE, supra note 242, at 169 ("Even if the agent retains the
ability to grasp the moral principles we hold her to, she will lack the ability to apply
them correctly in the situations she actually confronts.").
The views described in the text are all compatible views, meaning they start from
the premise that "true" or "genuine" free will (the ability to originate one's own act)
is not a prerequisite for moral responsibility. There is an alternative view, according
to which "true" or "genuine" free will is required. This view, which I will call
originationism, has been under attack for some time, and much of originationist
literature today is devoted to defending the essential originationist premise (that
responsibility requires "true" free will), but it is likely that even if originationism is
correct, originationists must also further specify the features the responsible actor
must have. Merely being "free" is probably not enough. For example, the responsible
actor must also have abilities to see and understand morally significant facts in her
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It is the latter sort of sensitivity-perceptual or epistemic
sensitivity to morally significant facts-that schematic cognition
most directly calls into question.
2. The Schematic Account Raises Questions About Our Moral
Sensitivity
Schematic psychology suggests that we are sometimes
insufficiently sensitive to morally significant facts to be morally
responsible for our acts. This is so in at least two ways. First,
accessible schemas sometimes skew our perceptual process such
that we are rendered insensitive to certain morally relevant
phenomena in our surroundings. Even though sensory
impressions of those phenomena may enter iconic memory, they
do not enter consciousness, are not encoded in long-term
memory, and therefore, cannot influence our deliberations,
choices, or actions. Second, accessible schemas sometimes
skew how we interpret ambiguous phenomena, increasing the
likelihood that we will misidentify morally relevant features of
those phenomena. As a result, we sometimes fail to perceive, or
fail to identify correctly, morally relevant facts. Both problems
are magnified by the arbitrary way in which perception and
interpretation are skewed; for our biases and misinterpretations
are radically detached from our beliefs, desires, and values. As a
result, I will argue, schematic cognition sometimes undermines
our sensitivity to morally significant facts in a way that
undercuts our moral responsibility. Indeed, it may do so far
more commonly than conventional moral psychology recognizes.
a. Schematic Cognition Skews Perception of Morally Relevant
Facts
Schematic psychology suggests that the perceptual process
that should enable us to perceive morally relevant facts in our
environment is sometimes impaired in unexpected and important
ways. Once schema and other knowledge structures become
accessible, they can make us insensitive to morally significant
facts in our environment (even when those facts are accessible to
our senses). Moreover, they skew our perceptions in ways that
we are generally unaware of and unable to control and in ways




that can be radically detached from and even in opposition to our
values. As a result, we are sometimes blind to morally
significant facts and blind in ways for which we are not
responsible. In these situations, we may not satisfy the
requirements for morally responsible agency.
As we have seen, schematic cognition makes our perceptual
process susceptible to significant bias. In order to manage the
potentially overwhelming flood of information our senses bring to
us, we must sort it and filter it, discarding most of it before it
reaches our consciousness.2 7 1  To do so, we utilize knowledge
structures like schemas and scripts to separate the information
that will be retained and noticed from the information that will
be discarded. In enabling us to sort enormous quantities of
information, these knowledge structures are serving a vital
purpose. At the same time, however, they inevitably steer and
skew our perceptions. Functioning as a scanning pattern, an
accessible schema sets us up to see certain things while
depressing or even blocking our sensitivity to other things. We
see "what the accessible constructs in the mind make [us]
perceptually ready to see."272 This is why we are more likely to
notice schema-relevant information than schema-irrelevant
information and more likely to notice schema-consistent
information than schema-inconsistent information. This is why
we notice different facts about a house if we are thinking about it
from a buyer's perspective than we do if we are thinking about it
from a burglar's perspective and are more likely to spot hooligan-
related words in a word-jumble if the schema for hooligans has
been primed. In schematic cognition, accessible schemas help set
our perceptual priorities, and these perceptual priorities bias
what we perceive, heightening our sensitivity to some facts while
depressing our sensitivity to others.
The perceptual biases intrinsic to schematic cognition can
impair our sensitivity to morally significant facts in our
environment. Indeed, the research on schematic cognition is
rife with suggestive illustrations of this problem. Consider,
for example, Darley and Batson's famous Good Samaritan
experiment, in which seminary students who were told they were
late for a presentation sometimes failed to even notice a
271 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 386.
272 Id.
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moaning, disheveled man they walked past (or over!) on the
sidewalk.273 With schema for hurrying, obligations to others, or
self-presentation accessible and highly charged, their scanning
patterns reflexively excluded morally significant information
about the stranger's suffering. Research on racial and gender
stereotypes is similarly suggestive. When gender stereotypes are
accessible, for example, subjects are less likely to notice
stereotype-inconsistent behavior. In some cases, this will impair
perception of morally significant facts. Supervisors in accounting
or programming firms may fail to perceive that a female
employee handles a computation problem more quickly or
accurately than her male peers, and this blindness may influence
morally significant decisions about professional rewards and
promotions. Police officers watching crowds or cars in public
places may be less likely to notice white actors' (stereotype-
inconsistent) disorderly conduct or moving violations than
(stereotype-consistent) disorderly conduct or moving violations by
black actors, and this bias may influence morally significant
decisions about stops, frisks, searches, and arrests. In cases like
these, schematic cognition appears to render actors insensitive to
morally significant facts.
Schematic psychology shows something more, too. In
addition to showing that we are sometimes insensitive to morally
significant facts, it also shows that we are often rendered
insensitive to morally significant facts in ways we do not see,
cannot control, and might well disapprove. As we have seen, we
can be endowed with a schema without realizing it and even if we
consciously reject the content of the schema. There is ample
evidence, for example, that a person who strongly endorses racial
egalitarianism may nevertheless absorb a full complement of
racially biased stereotypes from his political culture. When such
schema are activated, they may produce in us perceptual
blindspots that we are unaware of and would not approve. The
dynamics of accessibility magnify the problem. As we have seen,
once we are endowed with a schema, it can be primed by passing
and incidental environmental stimuli. A picture of Bobby Knight
or Dracula plastered on a street light pole might prime the
schema for hostility in us, for example. Indeed, it may do so even
273 The example is taken from one of the seminal experiments in situationist
psychology-Darley and Batson's so-called "good-samaritan" experiment.
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if we register it as an inconsequential phenomenon or even if we
do not register it at all (as when we are exposed to it
subliminally). Moreover, as we have seen, certain phenomena
have the ability to make schemas chronically accessible-and
thus perpetually influential-in ways that have no relation to our
values. For example, cultural institutions will chronically prime
schema in us whether we want them to or not. In a theocratic
state, even an atheist will have certain religious schemas
chronically accessible. In a culture where racial stereotypes are
common, even a racial egalitarian will have chronically accessible
racist schemas.
Schematic cognition then, suggests that our perceptual
priorities will often be radically independent of our values,
preferences, and desires. It is perfectly possible that, though we
would prefer to be sensitive to suffering, coincidental features of
our culture or environment have endowed us with schemas and
primed and chronically stimulated those schemas in a way that
depresses our sensitivity to suffering. Our perceptual priorities
are, to some extent, set for us, and they can be set in ways that
we would not choose or approve. It is not a stretch to say that
while we see the world through a biased lens, the bias is not our
own. Unwanted but accessible schema will influence our
scanning patterns and render us insensitive to morally
significant facts in ways inconsistent with our own values.
In some cases, this unwanted insensitivity to morally
significant facts undercuts moral responsibility. It is not that
sensitivity to morally significant facts is implicated in every act.
But in some cases, morally significant conduct is influenced by
unwanted failures to perceive morally significant facts.
Consider, for example, the seminary students who stepped over
the moaning man on the sidewalk without stopping to help. Our
first impulse is to blame them for their callousness and to hold
them responsible if the moaning man's ailment subsequently
injures or kills him.274 But schematic psychology enables us to
analyze the situation more carefully. Some of the seminary
students probably noticed the moaning man but chose not to
help. Their choice seems callous, and it makes sense to hold
"I Of course, in the Good Samaritan experiments, the moaning man was an
actor and not actually in peril. Had he not been an actor, the conduct of the students
would have raised the questions discussed in the text.
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them responsible for its consequences. 275  Other students,
however, may not have noticed him for the reason that their
accessible schemas skewed their perceptions. For some of this
group, the accessible schemas in play were consistent with their
values. Here, we may still think it appropriate to hold the
students responsible-perhaps on the grounds that they are
responsible for their value-consistent failure to perceive the
suffering man, and thus responsible for the consequences of that
failure . 6  For other subjects in the group, however, the
accessible schemas in play were inconsistent with their values.
These subjects should not be held responsible for their failure to
register the suffering man or for any subsequent injury to him.
Though they should have noticed him and should have helped
him, their capacity to notice him had been disabled, and was
disabled for reasons that they could not control. Schematic
psychology, then, enables us to see that in some cases in which
we would normally think it natural and obvious to blame and
punish a person, blame and punishment are not actually
appropriate; for sometimes, the strange and unexpected
275 Or if it does not, it is for different reasons than the ones explored here.
276 Why should a person ever be blamed for failing to see, hear, or smell
something? One possible reason why such failures sometimes seem to have a moral
valence is that we suspect that the perceiver has given some facts priority over
others in the perception process-that some sort of value or choice drives the failure
to register the overlooked facts. Perception is not just a passive mechanical process.
The person who is surprisingly blind to morally significant facts is blind for reasons
that say something about him as a moral agent. He is implicated in how his
perceptual priorities are set.
Schematic psychology does appear to reinforce the intuition that we are sometimes
responsible for our own failures to perceive. This is because some of our perceptual
priorities are set by our own values. Because we frequently consult our values in
daily life, those values and schemas associated with those values become chronically
accessible. Once these value-related schemas have become chronically accessible,
they influence what we perceive. A person who commits to egalitarian values is more
likely to notice opportunities for egalitarian behavior. He may, for example, be more
likely than others to notice the suffering man underfoot. Thus, in adopting certain
values, we influence which schemas are chronically accessible for us, and thus,
influence what we perceive. If this is right, then our values are at least sometimes
implicated in our perceptual priorities, and it is at least sometimes sensible to praise
us for perceiving morally significant facts and to blame us for failing to notice them.
That is, in some cases we blame a person for a failure to perceive a morally
significant fact because we think the person is responsible for disabling his own
capacity to perceive that fact. Such analysis, of course, depends on the contestable
assumption that we acquire or commit to values in ways that can sustain




machinery of schematic cognition renders us surprisingly and
non-culpably blind to morally significant facts right in front of us.
Schematic psychology then, supplies a framework for
challenging attributions of responsibility in some cases where we
would normally be inclined to hold people responsible. Of course,
the challenge suggested here does not appear to be a global
challenge to moral responsibility. It does not allege that we are
always surprisingly and non-culpably blind to morally significant
facts. Rather, it suggests that our capacity to perceive such facts
is non-culpably disabled in some particular cases. In this sense,
it puts us in a position to identify a particular class of cases in
which actors who appear responsible actually are not.
But we should not underestimate the significance of this
threat to conventional accounts of moral responsibility, for the
frequency of this impairment may be much greater than we are
inclined to expect. We are generally unaware of the influence of
accessible schemas on us, so we are likely to be quite poor
intuitive judges of how common such impairments are. We are
likely to underestimate their frequency. It is hard enough for us
to imagine that such a problem is present in the Good Samaritan
scenario (until we study schematic psychology), but what about
the sorts of scenarios that more commonly lead to moral
approbation and criminal charges? What if I am in a tussle with
another person, and I fail to perceive gestures or other signals
that he is trying to withdraw. I may later have trouble
convincing you of my self-defense claim, in part because you will
find it implausible that I failed to see those signs. Yet schematic
psychology makes it plausible that, with a schema for hostility
highly charged, I failed to perceive schema-inconsistent facts
(such as my victim's gestures and signals of withdrawal). Along
the same lines, if the exhausted fry-cook bumps me and I look up
to see whether retaliation is necessary, I may fail to perceive
signs, signals, or cues that the bump was unintentional and non-
hostile. Or if a suspect pulls a wallet from his pocket when I
order him to put his hands up, I may fail to register aspects of his
posture and arm position consistent with holding a wallet and
inconsistent with holding a gun. Especially in these sorts of
rapidly evolving physical encounters-encounters involving
significant urgency and cognitive load-we are likely to be
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influenced by accessible schemas27 7 that we ourselves are
unaware of and do not choose, and these schemas may block us
from registering small details that make a big difference with
respect to what we do. If bystanders and after-the-fact
evaluators are not familiar with schematic cognition, they may
reject our accounts of such situations as either obviously
insincere or obviously unreasonable, and therefore, hold us
responsible. Non-culpable insensitivity to morally significant
facts, then, may play a much more pervasive role in bad conduct
than we are prepared to recognize either intuitively or on the
basis of personal experience.
Thus, even if this is not, formally speaking, a global
challenge to responsibility, it is nevertheless a potentially
significant one. Non-culpable moral insensitivity is likely
implicated in some of the scenarios that give rise to bad conduct
and may be implicated in many of them. It is likely a factor more
often than we realize and more often than we are equipped to
recognize. Our default tendency to attribute responsibility to bad
actors is, then, less reliable than it seems: It fails to account for
non-culpable moral insensitivity. Moreover, our confidence that
actors are generally sufficiently morally sensitive to be
considered morally responsible may be misplaced. In short,
schematic psychology gives us reasons to doubt our judgments
about moral responsibility in particular cases and reasons to
question our presumption of moral responsibility generally.
b. Schematic Cognition Skews Interpretation of Morally Relevant
Facts
Along the same lines, schematic cognition appears to skew
interpretation of morally significant facts in a way that poses
problems for moral sensitivity and moral responsibility. Once
schema and other knowledge structures become accessible, they
can significantly influence how we interpret ambiguous
phenomena in our environment, making us less likely to
accurately identify those phenomena. This interpretative
bias can result in failures to properly identify morally
significant facts. Moreover, such knowledge structures skew our
277 Many aspects of schematic cognition are most influential when actors make
quick judgments and when actors are under cognitive load (for example, engaged in
multiple cognitive operations, such as choreographing complex physical activity
while evaluating a potential threat).
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interpretations in ways that we are generally unaware of and
unable to control and in ways that can be radically detached
from, and even in opposition to, our values. As a result, we
sometimes misidentify morally significant facts and do so in ways
we are not responsible for. In these situations, we may not
satisfy the requirements for morally responsible agency.
Interpreting ambiguous stimuli is one of the central tasks of
our daily lives. For example, we place great importance on other
people's words, tones, facial expressions, postures, and acts-but
all of these things are commonly sufficiently ambiguous to
require interpretation. Was that a sincere apology or a snide
mockery? Is he relaxed or bored? Interpreting such ambiguous
social phenomena plays a central role in our daily lives.278
Interpreting ambiguous human conduct is also implicated in
many morally loaded situations, including the sorts of situations
that most commonly give rise to questions of blame and
punishment. Is the man lying on the sidewalk sleeping off some
drinks or having a medical emergency? Was that bump an
accident or an insult? Is the black object in that man's hand
a wallet or a gun? Bernhard Goetz famously interpreted a
young black man's smile as a signal that the young man
intended to "play with" and "maim" him." 9 On the basis of
that interpretation, he tried to kill the young man. If his
interpretation was unreasonable, he was guilty of attempted
murder. If his interpretation was accurate or reasonable, he
acted in justified self-defense (so, anyway, thought the jury in his
case). It is not a stretch to say that many of our morally
significant decisions, including the sorts of decisions implicated
in the conflicts that give rise to insult, injury, and death, are
strongly influenced by our interpretations of ambiguous
phenomena.
As we have seen, however, schematic cognition makes our
interpretive process susceptible to significant bias. Just as
accessible schemas can bias the scanning patterns that structure
our perceptions, they can bias our interpretive tendencies as
278 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 389, 412. There is very substantial overlap in
the visible cues of anger and play, fear and excitement, affection and sycophancy,
and depression and disdain. How we interpret these cues makes a huge difference
with respect to how we live our lives. It is also often implicated in the most
important choices we make.
279 See generally People v. Goetz, 73 N.Y.2d 751, 532 N.E.2d 1273, 536 N.Y.S.2d
45 (1988).
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well. We are more likely to interpret ambiguous events in ways
suggested by and consistent with accessible schema. Thus,
schema accessibility determines whether we interpret a little
girl's performance on a test as above average or below average
and whether we see recklessness or adventurousness in a story
about a mountain climber. This is why priming fear or anxiety
schemas leads us to interpret muffled noises as frightening
ones 280 and why a person who has accessible egalitarian schemas
is more likely to interpret ambiguous situations as offering
opportunities for egalitarian behavior. Thus, as Moskowitz says,
accessibility will make a tremendous difference to judgments of
great significance like "[wihat type of behavior did she just
display-playful or aggressive?" and "[wihat type of object is in
that guy's hand-a gun or a wallet?" 281
Moreover, schematic psychology shows that our
interpretative tendencies are quite often skewed in ways we are
unaware of, cannot control, and would not approve. As we have
seen, family and cultural environments can endow us with
schemas we would not have chosen and even schemas that we
disapprove of. Moreover, as we have seen, the things that make
schemas accessible-seemingly inconsequential passing primes
and persistent chronic stimuli-have no particular connection to
our values or preferences. As a result, influential schema can
operate in us without our awareness or approval, and our
interpretative tendencies will, therefore, sometimes be radically
independent of our values, preferences, and desires.
Consequently, our interpretations of morally significant
ambiguous phenomena are sometimes skewed and skewed in
ways we do not control and would not approve. Though we would
prefer not to see innocent bumps as preludes to violence and
wallets as guns, cultural influences can endow us with schemas
that make us more likely to do so, and passing primes and
chronic schema can magnify the likelihood that we will do
so. Even if we do not wish to be inclined to see hostility,
encountering a person who appears hostile can prime the concept
of hostility, making us more likely to interpret other people as
hostile too.28 2  A person who has been exposed to words
suggesting anger becomes more likely to read ambiguous stimuli
280 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 397-98.
281 Id. at 435 (internal quotation marks omitted).
282 See id. at 407.
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"in a manner consistent with" anger.28 3 "Trivial exposure to these
concepts" makes a significant difference to how we interpret
other people's behavior.28 4 And, of course, "[i]f the trait 'hostility'
is chronically accessible" (as it might be for someone raised in an
abusive household, a militaristic society, or a street gang culture)
"we will be quicker to label [an ambiguous] behavior as
hostile"285-that is, for example, to see a bump as an aggression.
Likewise, a police officer may reject cultural stereotypes
associating black men with violence, yet nevertheless be
endowed with such schemas by the general political culture or
police culture (or both), which are then primed or chronically
stimulated by environmental phenomena over which she has no
control. Along these lines, Moskowitz links Duncan's shove
experiment-in which observers tended to interpret a shove as
playful when inflicted by a white person but hostile when
inflicted by a black person 28 6 -to the Diallo shooting, in which
police saw a black man fumbling for his wallet and shot him
forty-one times, purportedly construing his behavior as fumbling
for a gun 287 : "[T]he decision to shoot may be determined by the
perception of threat, and the perception of threat may be
determined by a target person's group membership."28 8 In short,
schematic psychology teaches that our interpretative tendencies
can be set in ways that we would neither choose nor approve,
such that we misinterpret the world and do so in a way that does
not reflect our choices, preferences, or values. Unwanted but
accessible schema will influence our interpretive frameworks
and render us unreliable interpreters of morally significant
ambiguous phenomena in ways inconsistent with our own values.
282 Id. at 398.
4 Id. at 409.
285 Id. at 386.
286 Id. at 463-65.
287 Id. at 465.
288 Id. at 466. Fleshing out the picture further:
[Plolice officers may have notions of danger... accessible while walking
the beat[,] ... mak[ing] even the best-intentioned officers perceptually
ready to see a threat in an ambiguous situation .... Consider the tragic
tale of Amadou Diallo... shot dead in New York City when.. . police
officers incorrectly identified an object Diallo was reaching for as a gun. It
was, instead, a wallet. The officers, perhaps perceptually ready to see
danger, interpreted Diallo's action as one that should prompt them to open
fire on what turned out to be an unarmed man.
Id. at 436.
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In some cases, this unwanted interpretive unreliability
undercuts moral responsibility. It is not that misinterpretation
is implicated in every act or that every misinterpretation is non-
culpable. But in some cases, morally significant conduct is
influenced by non-culpable failures to properly identify morally
significant facts. Consider, for example, the seminary students
who stepped over the moaning man on the sidewalk without
stopping to help. Even if they did notice the man, they still faced
interpretive challenges: Is the man on the sidewalk sleeping off
a drink, or is he prostrate with pain? Is he mumbling or
moaning? Is he curled up to keep the sun out of his eyes or
doubled over in agony? If the student misinterprets the situation
because he has embraced schemas disdainful of homeless people
("they're free-riding fakers"), we may be inclined to hold the
student responsible for his misinterpretations and for any
subsequent injuries the moaning man incurs." 9 But if the
student misinterprets the situation because he has been endowed
with such schema even though he does not approve them, holding
him responsible seems inappropriate. Though the student
should have recognized the signs of suffering and should,
therefore, have helped the suffering man, the student's capacity
to accurately interpret the signs of suffering was impaired, and
this capacity was impaired for reasons that he could not control.
Schematic psychology then, enables us to see that in some cases
in which we would normally think it natural and obvious to
blame and punish a person, blame and punishment are not
actually appropriate, for sometimes the strange and unexpected
machinery of schematic cognition renders people surprisingly
and non-culpably poor judges of morally significant ambiguous
phenomena.
Schematic psychology then, supplies a framework for
challenging attributions of responsibility in some cases where we
would normally be inclined to hold people responsible. Again,
this is not a global challenge to moral responsibility. It does not
allege that we are always surprisingly and non-culpably poor
289 Schematic psychology makes this impulse more comprehensible. We want to
blame the student in this example because we suspect that his interpretations
reflect his values. We think the person who sees hostility or a gun in an ambiguous
event does so for reasons that say something about him as a moral person-that his
perceptual tendencies are morally significant and that he is implicated in how those
tendencies are set. In some cases, then, we are inclined to think that a person is
morally responsible for his own inaccurate interpretations of ambiguous stimuli.
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judges of morally significant ambiguous phenomena. Rather, it
suggests that our interpretations are undermined in some
particular cases. But again, we should not underestimate the
significance of this threat to conventional accounts of moral
responsibility; for the frequency of this impairment may be much
greater than we are inclined to expect. We are generally
unaware of the influence of accessible schemas on us, so we
are likely to underestimate the frequency of interpretive
impairments. Until we study schematic psychology, it is difficult
for us to imagine that such a problem is present in the "Good
Samaritan" scenario. The same is true of scenarios that more
commonly lead to moral approbation and criminal charges. What
if a passerby accidentally bumps me, and I interpret his
unintended contact as a threat? I may later have trouble
convincing you of my self-defense claim, in part because you will
find it implausible that I could have made such a mistake. Yet
schematic psychology makes it plausible that, with a schema for
hostility highly (and chronically) charged, I misinterpreted the
ambiguous physical contact as a prelude to violence rather than a
mundane misstep. Or what if a suspect pulls a wallet from his
pocket when I order him to put his hands up, and I interpret the
black object in his hand as a gun? Especially in these sorts of
rapidly evolving physical encounters-encounters involving
significant urgency and cognitive load-we are likely to be
influenced by accessible schemas2 90 that we are unaware of and
do not choose, and these schemas may significantly skew our
interpretations of ambiguous phenomena. Thus, again, if
bystanders and after-the-fact evaluators are not familiar
with schematic cognition, they may reject our accounts of
such situations as either obviously insincere or obviously
unreasonable, and therefore, hold us responsible. Non-culpable
interpretive errors regarding morally significant ambiguous
phenomena, then, may play a much more pervasive role in bad
conduct than we are intuitively prepared to recognize.
Even if this is not a global challenge to responsibility, it is a
potentially significant one. Non-culpable interpretive bias is
likely implicated in some of the scenarios that give rise to bad
conduct and may be implicated in many of them. It is likely a
factor more often than we realize and more often than we are
290 See supra note 277.
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equipped to recognize. Our default tendency to attribute
responsibility to bad actors is, then, less reliable than it seems:
It fails to account for non-culpable interpretive errors. Moreover,
our confidence that actors are generally sufficiently morally
sensitive to be considered morally responsible may be misplaced.
In short, schematic psychology once again gives us reasons to
doubt our judgments about moral responsibility in particular
cases and reasons to question our presumption of moral
responsibility generally.
3. The Internal Challenge: In Sum
Schematic psychology then, has unexpected and strange
ramifications for human moral sensitivity, and thus, for moral
responsibility. While nothing in schematic psychology shows
that human actors entirely lack moral sensitivity, schematic
psychology suggests that our moral sensitivity is sometimes
impaired in unexpected and important ways. In particular,
schematic psychology suggests that our perceptual or epistemic
sensitivity-our sensitivity to morally significant facts-
regularly fails. It fails because the knowledge structures we
rely on to sort and filter the flood of information available to
our senses skew our perceptions such that we fail to see
morally significant facts. And it fails because those knowledge
structures bias our interpretations such that we misidentify and
misunderstand those facts. Moreover, schematic psychology
shows that we are generally unaware of and unable to control
these influences and that they can bias our perceptions and
interpretations in ways flatly inconsistent with our most deeply
held values. Finally, schematic psychology suggests that such
failures are considerably more common than we realize and that
they may play an especially important role in situations likely to
raise questions of blame and punishment-namely, situations
where judgments must be made quickly while under cognitive
load.
In short, schematic psychology shows that we are susceptible
to non-culpable failures to perceive and identify morally
significant facts and that such failures are sufficiently
common and significant not only to undermine attributions of
responsibility in particular cases, but to raise questions about
our default assumption that most actors are responsible in
most cases. Schematic psychology suggests amendments to
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conventional moral psychology, and once these amendments are
made, the traditional assumption that human actors are morally
responsible actors is called into question. And because moral
responsibility is generally considered a prerequisite for criminal
responsibility, it is also no longer appropriate to make the
general assumption that criminal actors are responsible for their
crimes.
B. The External Challenge
Section A offers an internal challenge to our moral
responsibility, contending that, on traditional accounts of
responsibility, we lack some of the features necessary to be fully
responsible actors. This Section takes a different tack, offering
an external challenge, arguing that schematic psychology raises
doubts about the project of attributing responsibility to
individual human actors itself. Schematic psychology shows that
our conduct is influenced in deep and unexpected ways by
cultural and environmental influences, both circumstantial and
constitutive. If this is right, holding us responsible for our
conduct raises significant fairness problems, problems which
undercut the reactive attitudes associated with holding
individuals responsible.
1. Our Conduct Is Shaped by Cultural and Environmental
Influences
One of the central lessons from schematic psychology is that
our conduct is shaped by our cultures and environments. Of
course, no one should be surprised to hear that we are influenced
by our cultures and environments, but the research on schematic
cognition fills out the process with surprising and provocative
details. In particular, schematic psychology shows that cultural
and environmental phenomena have unexpected constitutive
and circumstantial influences on our perceptual priorities,
interpretative tendencies, and motivations, and thus, ultimately,
on our conduct.
a. Constitutive Influences on Conduct
Schematic cognition shows that culture and environment
shape our conduct by shaping who we are in a deep and
unexpected way. In particular, culture and environment endow
us with persisting perceptual priorities, interpretive tendencies,
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and motivations. They do so by providing us with complex and
diverse schema packages that play an important role in setting
our long-term perceptual priorities, interpretive tendencies, and
motivations, and by chronically stimulating certain schema so
that those schema become chronically accessible and exercise a
persisting influence on our perceptions, interpretations, and
motivations.
As we have seen, the research on schematic cognition
suggests that we are schema sponges-that is, we absorb
complex and comprehensive packages of expectations, attitudes,
desires, and values from the culture and environment around
us.291 American political culture has long transmitted race and
gender stereotypes. Some cultures transmit an individualistic
orientation, while others transmit a collectivist orientation (with
ramifications for how culture members understand an enormous
range of issues in their lives, from relationship obligations to
responsibility attributions). Our cultures may endow us
with schemas for various important relationships (father-son,
husband-wife, friend-friend), for common events (buying ice
cream from an ice cream truck, ordering food off a menu at a
restaurant), and even for the structure of a "good story."2 92 It is
not a stretch to say then, that each of us carries a heavy
endowment of culturally transmitted schemas.
Indeed, there are likely to be multiple competing sources for
schema endowment in the environment. For example, there may
be many subcultures within the dominant culture (regional,
community-based, professional, etc.) and such subcultures may
transmit at least some (if not many) schema that differ from the
dominant culture's schema package.293  Exposure to these
911 As we have also seen, this process often proceeds in a way that is resistant or
immune to our intervention. We are often unaware that we are absorbing schemas,
making it impossible for us to mediate the absorption process. Moreover, even when
we are aware of the process, we have significant difficulty intervening: It is not easy
for us to avoid absorbing schemas. Indeed, we are so "absorbent" that we are likely
to assimilate schema that we do not endorse and even schema that we consider
repulsive. In short, we are voracious sponges for schema. As a result, we are likely to
carry a significant endowment of environmentally transmitted schemas.
292 See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 120.
93 See KUNDA, supra note 2, at 517, 549-56 (noting that in the United States,
southern and northern cultures have traditionally transmitted different conceptions
of threats to honor). Id. at 557 ("Distinctive patterns of making sense of people may
also emerge between men and women, between Jews and gentiles, between African
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subcultures presumably further diversifies a person's schema
package. Likewise, we each participate in families and peer
groups that may develop and transmit their own distinctive
schema packages, just as cultures do. Moreover, we are likely to
develop schemas experientially, as part of the process of
understanding the things that happen to us (even if our culture
supplies no schema for tigers, we will develop a schema for tigers
if we encounter a few). Misfortunes, for example, may feed
pessimistic schemas and, ultimately, depression itself.294
Persistent life conditions, such as poverty or community violence
probably inculcate other analogous schemas. In short, culture,
sub-cultures, families, peer groups, distinctive experiences, and
persisting environmental phenomena work collectively to endow
us with deep and complex schema packages.
This endowment of culturally and environmentally
transmitted schemas has profound constitutive significance, for it
is the raw material from which many of our persisting and
characteristic perceptual priorities, interpretive tendencies, and
motivations will be drawn.295 Culturally and environmentally
transmitted schemas are often complex knowledge structures.
They incorporate empirical components (claims about what
things in the world are), affective components (associating
people, objects, and events with feelings and attitudes), and
normative components (attaching moral valences to people,
objects, events, and states of affairs). When such a complex
knowledge structure is activated, it can influence not only what
we perceive and how we interpret stimuli, but also our beliefs,
expectations, attitudes and feelings, and even our desires, goals,
and values.296 Thus, when culture and environment endow us
Americans and White Americans, between urban and rural individuals, and between
professional and working-class individuals.").
294 See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 2, at 381-85 (on depressive schemas).
295 FIsKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 264-65 ("Persistent differences in what is
primed by one's typical situation may lead to individual differences in what is
chronically primed .... Dimensions that are frequently accessed or permanently
primed may become central aspects of one's personality...."); see KUNDA, supra
note 2, at 287 (noting that we have "idiosyncratic pattern[s] of automatic
associations to different situational cues," and that these patterns may be "at the
very core of our personality").
296 Note that this cultural endowment may not result in a single, unified
character or personality. While a package of culturally transmitted schemas may
contain an array of personality components, these components may be a hodge-
podge, rather than a coherently organized package. Indeed, it is perfectly possible
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with schemas, they create in us potential perceptual priorities,
interpretive tendencies, and motivations.
Culture and environment also have the power to tap these
potentials and to turn them into persisting features of who we
are. As we have seen, a person who carries a schema is liable to
be influenced by that schema, but such influence will not
materialize unless the schema is rendered accessible. And, as we
have seen, some environments make some schema chronically
accessible. For example, cultural institutions-government,
church, schools, etc.-persistently articulate, refer to, or invoke
preferred schemas. Leaders, preachers, and teachers repeat
them. Public displays-banners and signs, public art and
advertising-refresh them. Media (news, television, movies,
literature) incorporate them into the reports and stories
they disseminate. Family members and peers echo them
back and forth. Through these and other similar mechanisms,
a political culture not only inculcates preferred schema,
but also persistently stimulates those schema, making them
chronically accessible, and thus, chronically influential in
perception, interpretation, and motivation. In this way, a
nationalistic political culture will make patriotic schema
chronically accessible, while a theocratic political culture will
make religious schema chronically accessible. Patriarchal
cultures will chronically stimulate certain schema about sex
roles, materialistic cultures stimulate certain schema about
possession and wealth, macho or militaristic cultures stimulate
certain schema about power and violence. Some cultures will
chronically stimulate schema pertaining to achievement; some
will consistently trigger conceptual frameworks revolving around
physical appearance. Political cultures then, do not just endow
us with schemas, they also make those schemas chronically
accessible, and thus, persistently influential in determining what
that some components will fit uneasily or even conflict with each other. Such
incoherence or conflict may never become apparent, however, because incoherent or
conflicting schema elements may not be rendered accessible at the same time. One
schema may be accessible and influential at time X, while another is accessible and
influential at time Y. Indeed, this possibility lines up well with another line of
empirical research, known as situationism, which shows that we are strikingly
susceptible to environmental influences on our conduct and that (on one
interpretation) we do not have consistent "characters" across situations at all.
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we perceive, how we interpret ambiguous stimuli, and what we
are motivated to do.297
In short, culture and environment can have a profound
influence on "who we are." First, they endow us with a complex
and comprehensive package of schemas, providing the raw
material from which many of our persisting and characteristic
perceptual priorities, interpretive tendencies, and motivations
are drawn. Second, they play a profound role in determining
which schemas are chronically accessible, and therefore,
persistently influential in our daily lives.298 In this way, they
influence "who we are."
In shaping these aspects of "who we are," they also exercise a
significant influence over what we do. Because chronically
accessible schemas have a persisting effect on perceptual
priorities, interpretive tendencies, and motivations, they
inevitably influence our conduct. We will not stop to help a
suffering man if we do not see that he is suffering, and some
culturally and environmentally transmitted schema may make
us persistently less likely to see that he is. We are more likely to
react violently to a bump if we perceive it as hostile and some
culturally and environmentally transmitted schema will produce
in us a tendency to see it as such. Both helping behavior and
aggression are likely to be influenced by our values and desires,
and culturally and environmentally transmitted schema may
have a profound influence on just which values and desires we
27 Of course, political culture isn't the only source of chronic stimulation: Other
features of our environment can serve similar functions. It is surely true that sub-
cultures, peer-cultures, and family-cultures can repeatedly stimulate schema.
Indeed, ongoing exposure to any sort of environmental phenomenon should have this
potential: Frequent encounters with tragedy and tigers should chronically stimulate
schema associated with tragedy and tigers. There are several different vectors for
chronic environmental stimulation of endowed schema, and thus, several different
ways in which the environment can shape our persisting perceptual priorities,
interpretative tendencies, and motivations. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 2, at
264 (noting that variations in people's "typical situation[s]" can lead to "individual
differences in what is chronically primed for different people," and thus, in how
people interpret each other).
298 Note that this is not just a matter of endowing us with schemas and then
making those same schemas chronically accessible. It is possible, for example, that
cultures chronically stimulate only a subset of the schemas they transmit. Likewise,
it should be possible for a culture to chronically stimulate a schema it did not
inculcate-for example, in a person who acquired the schema while living in another
culture or from a non-cultural source (personal experience, a non- or counter-
cultural source, etc.).
20091
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
have. Thus, schematic cognition makes us susceptible to
constitutive environmental and cultural influences at several
levels, and these influences, in turn, can have a significant
impact on our conduct.
b. Circumstantial Influences on Conduct
Schematic psychology also highlights that passing
environmental phenomena can have a temporary but important
influence on our conduct. Such phenomena do not determine
"who we are," but they do temporarily influence our perceptions,
interpretations, and motivations, and thus, temporarily influence
what we do.
As we have seen, a person who carries a schema is liable to
be influenced by that schema if that schema is rendered
accessible. It is when schema become accessible that they
become scanning patterns for perception and frameworks for
interpretation, and it is then that they shape our expectations,
attitudes, feelings, desires, goals, and values. Thus, schemas
exercise their influence over us when they have been properly
triggered. We have also seen that some environmental and
cultural circumstances chronically stimulate schema, and thus,
make those schema chronically accessible. But sometimes
features of our circumstances have a more limited impact,
making schema temporarily accessible. As the research on
schematic cognition shows, passing, temporary stimuli can prime
schema for us. Momentary exposure to stimuli triggers schema
about or associated with those stimuli. Indeed, even subliminal
stimuli, not consciously registered, can trigger schema in this
way. Even if they are not chronically stimulated, such schema
may become temporarily accessible.
By making a schema temporarily accessible, a fleeting
stimulus can have a significant impact on our conduct. Once
triggered, the schema will skew perceptual priorities, alter
interpretive tendencies, and activate particular motivations.
Passing a poster of Bobby Knight brings hostility schemas to the
surface, making us more likely to see others as hostile and to
react as though they were and making us more likely to act
hostilely ourselves. Passing a poster of Mother Teresa brings up
schema for compassion, influencing how we see and react to
others, and influencing how we are motivated to act ourselves.
Seeing a dog makes us more likely to act loyally; a reminder of
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"mom" makes us more likely to perform well on a test. These
seemingly inconsequential and coincidental encounters with
momentary, passing features of the environment dictate which
schemas are accessible, and thus, which perceptual priorities,
interpretive tendencies, and motivations are at play in the
processes that lead to our conduct. Though they do not shape
"who we are," they influence-for a short time-what we do.
Thus, schematic psychology shows that we are susceptible to
passing, temporary influences on our conduct. Even fleeting
exposure to a stimulus can temporarily trigger associated
schema. This in turn, influences our perception, understanding,
and motivation and, inevitably, our conduct itself.
c. In Sum: Constitutive and Circumstantial Influence
Two themes from schematic psychology converge then, in
showing that our conduct is deeply susceptible to influence by
culture and by the environment generally. At one level, culture
and environment have a profound constitutive influence,
endowing us with schemas and making some of those schemas
chronically accessible, thereby shaping our personalities,
influencing what we see, how we interpret what we see, what
we want and value, and, ultimately, what we do. At the other
level, culture and environment play a circumstantial role in
determining our conduct; for fleeting and passing features of
culture and environment can temporarily prime schemas, and
thus, give those schemas temporary sway over our perceptions,
interpretations, motivations and, ultimately, our conduct.
Schematic psychology then, highlights some of the significant
and unexpected ways that culture and environment influence
what we do.
2. Fairness Concerns That Undercut Reactive Attitudes
Associated with Holding Responsible
If this is right, then holding us responsible for our conduct
raises concerns of fairness, concerns that may significantly
undercut the reactive attitudes associated with holding
individuals responsible.
Many of the most influential accounts of responsibility
tie responsibility to the reactive attitudes-reactions like
resentment and indignation that we experience when en-
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countering antisocial or criminal conduct. 299 As P. F. Strawson
explained in the seminal Freedom and Resentment,00 these
reactive attitudes fund our intuitions about moral
responsibility."' Indeed, several influential accounts of
responsibility treat these reactive attitudes as the best
evidence of the features an actor must have in order to be held
responsible; we only experience resentment and indignation
toward actors with certain characteristics, so these
characteristics must be prerequisites for moral responsibility.02
For example, reasons-responsiveness theories, which are
currently very influential in responsibility theory, are commonly
tied to the reactive attitudes.3
While the reactive attitudes are sometimes portrayed as
inevitable and invulnerable, most theorists recognize that the
reactive attitudes associated with responsibility attributions can
be undercut or transformed by information about the actor. Gary
Watson provides a classic illustration in Responsibility and the
Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme.30 4 There, he
first presents a description of a brutal murder (drawing on
contemporary newspaper accounts) and observes that the
reactive attitudes the murder evokes support attribution of
responsibility in exactly the way that Strawson suggested.3 0 5
Reading the graphic description of the callous and senseless
killing, we feel intense indignation. The feelings seem non-
negotiable, and in their light, holding the killer morally
responsible for the killing seems not just right, but inevitable. 6
299 For seminal accounts of our reactive attitudes and their role in attributions of
moral responsibility, see Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WILL 72
(Gary Watson ed., 2d ed. 2003), and WALLACE, supra note 242, at 18-83. For
Strawson, resentment is a typical reaction to a malevolent act against oneself;
indignation is a typical reaction to a malevolent act against another. See Strawson,
supra, at 77, 84.
In the discussion that follows, I do not assume that the reactive attitude account of
responsibility is the best one. Rather, I use the reactive attitude framework because
it provides a helpful language for bringing out situationism's threat to responsibility.
300 See Strawson, supra note 299, at 72-93.
30 See id. at 89-93.
302 See, e.g., FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 242, at 1-8; WALLACE, supra note
242, at 62-83.
303 See, e.g., FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 242, at 1-8.
304 See GARY WATSON, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a
Strawsonian Theme, in AGENCY AND ANSWERABILITY 219 (2004).
30' See id. at 236-39.
306 See id. at 238.
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But Watson then goes on to tell us more about the killer, filling
in his personal history (again, drawing on contemporary
newspaper accounts). As he reveals, the killer himself was the
victim of awful cruelty and abuse throughout his childhood.
Family members recall that the heartless and brutal killer was
once a love-starved child, fruitlessly begging his heartless and
brutal parents for affection and attention, getting back hatred
and violence instead. 0 Fleshing out the story, Watson observes,
has an impact on our reactive attitudes. Though the killer's
awful personal history does not entirely disintegrate the
indignation we feel about the killing he has committed, 0 it does
introduce a second powerful strand of reactions that take us in a
very different direction, causing us to question responsibility
attribution, and thus, making the case for responsibility
attribution more ambiguous and less inevitable.30 9
Some of these reactions have to do with intuitions about
what is fair. Seeing so clearly that the killer's brutality can be
traced to brutality inflicted on him by his parents, we realize that
blaming him is a little like him blaming him for his father's
sins.3 0 Likewise, seeing that he had no say in the conditions that
made him brutal-that they were, for him, the most awful sort of
lottery and that "it could have been me" if the dice had fallen
differently-we realize that our resentful reactions would allow
luck to determine who will be blamed and punished. 311 These
discoveries lead us to questions about the fairness of blaming and
punishing the killer: Isn't it unfair to punish him for his father's
sins; isn't it unfair to let luck determine which of us (him or
me) is punished?312  And these fairness questions, in turn,
undercut the resentment and indignation that made blame and
307 See id. at 239-42.
308 See id. at 242, 244. Or so maintains Watson. My own view is that such
personal history may, in some cases, completely dissolve resentment and
indignation. Because my own view is more controversial, however, I do not advance
or rely upon it in this Article. Instead, I build upon Watson's more moderate view of
this issue.
309 See id. at 242-43.
310 See id. at 243-44. The idea is not, of course, that he is being punished
without having done anything himself but that his punishment is a consequence of
acts-performed by his father-over which he had no control.
311 See id. at 245.
312 1 have developed an analogous argument for the findings of situationist
psychology (another line of contemporary empirical psychology). See generally Kaye,
supra note 3.
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punishment seem so natural. Our impulse to blame is at least
partially deflated or defused by the discovery of these fairness
problems . 13  The reactive attitudes that support responsibility
attributions, then, may be vulnerable. They may be diminished
by certain sorts of information about the person to whom we are
reacting.
Watson's piece highlights the significance of a certain sort of
personal history for our reactive attitudes. The discovery that
a wrongdoer was himself the victim of brutal formative
experiences, Watson shows, raises concerns about the fairness of
blaming and punishing the wrongdoer, and these fairness
concerns undercut or work against resentment and indignation.
Schematic psychology brings out another aspect of personal
history that both parallels and supplements Watson's discussion
of brutal formative experiences. This research does not revolve
around brutal formative experiences, but it does point to parallel
fairness concerns and may, therefore, undercut resentment and
indignation in analogous ways.
In particular, this research shows how environment and
culture can have surprising constitutive and circumstantial
influences on what we do. As we have seen, environment and
culture (including subcultures and peer and family cultures)
have deep constitutive influence on us. They endow us with
complex and comprehensive packages of schemas, and these
schemas have the potential to profoundly influence our
perceptual priorities, interpretative tendencies, and motivations.
Moreover, as we have seen, environment and culture chronically
stimulate some of these schemas, making them chronically
accessible, and thus, persistently influential in our perceptions,
interpretations, and motivations. Taken together, endowment
and chronic stimulation can have a significant influence on who
we are and, ultimately, on what we do. At the same time,
environment and culture have a significant circumstantial
influence. Passing and even subliminal stimuli can temporarily
trigger schema such that those schema then exercise a temporary
influence over perception, interpretation, and motivation, and
thus, conduct. Thus, when a stranger bumps into us on the
313 See WATSON, supra note 304, at 244-46. While Watson shows that these
fairness problems undercut resentment and indignation, he does not think that
encountering these fairness problems entirely dispatches those reactive attitudes.
See id. at 242, 244.
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street, our reaction is mediated by schema endowed by and made
accessible by our environments and cultures. When a suspect
pulls a dark object from his pocket, environment and culture are
implicated in what we see, how we interpret it, and how we are
motivated to react.
Seeing these constitutive and circumstantial influences at
work may have important implications for our attitudes towards
actors who do bad things, and thus, ultimately, for responsibility;
for they raise some of the same fairness concerns that Watson's
brutal formative experience example raised. As Watson's
example did, schematic psychology highlights the extent to which
blaming or punishing a person for a bad act is punishing him for
"another's sins." This is especially so when a person's act is the
product of culturally endowed and culturally stimulated schema.
In these cases, we might say, schematic cognition seems to show
culture working through us, cultivating in us perceptual,
interpretive, and motivational tendencies that channel us to act
in ways consistent with culturally propagated schema.114 If so, it
is not clear why reactive attitudes should affix to the individual
actor, as opposed to his culture. In the relationship between the
actor and his culture, the actor seems much more the puppet,
while the culture is much more the puppeteer. To blame and
punish the actor then, seems misguided and perverse-a willful
blindness to the sources of the conduct. Watson's example
suggests that this is a concern about fairness and that this
fairness concern undercuts the reactive attitudes associated with
responsibility attribution.
Likewise, as Watson's example did, schematic psychology
highlights the extent to which blaming or punishing a person for
a bad act is punishing him for his bad luck. Environment and
culture endow us with schema and stimulate those schema in
ways that we cannot control. The particular content of our
schema endowment is a matter of luck: It depends upon which
314 As Kunda suggests:
[Diifferent cultures may give rise to different collective, culturally shared
ways of constructing, defining, and extracting meaning from
situations .... As individuals follow the dictates of their respective
cultures, fulfilling the culturally dictated patterns of thought, feeling, and
behavior, they ultimately reinforce the very culture that had given rise to
these patterns in the first place. As you think and act in accordance with
your culture, you support and reproduce it.
KUNDA, supra note 2, at 542.
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culturally approved schema we are exposed to, which sub-
cultures, peer-cultures, and family-cultures we are placed in, and
which environmental and social conditions we are thrust into.
Likewise, the particular configuration of schema that is
accessible for us at any given time is a matter of happenstance-
of which chronic stimuli we have been exposed to and which
fleeting environmental stimuli have primed us. Thus, our
perceptual priorities, interpretative tendencies, and motivations
are generated in important ways by a process that is largely
beyond our control and largely unmoored to anything we can say
is truly "ours." They are generated, in a sense, by lottery. As
Watson's example suggests, this raises a fairness concern
that may undercut the reactive attitudes associated with
responsibility attribution. Blame and punishment are terrible
burdens for the blamed and the punished: The instinct that they
should not be distributed by a roll of the dice is a compelling one
with a significant capacity to neutralize the reactive attitudes
associated with responsibility attribution.
If worries about luck and the realization that "it could just as
well have been me"315 raise fairness concerns and if these fairness
concerns can undercut resentment and indignation, then
schematic psychology may well undermine the reactive attitudes
that fund responsibility attributions, highlighting the ways in
which they may be misdirected or arbitrary. Seeing the
constitutive and circumstantial influence of environment and
culture on schema endowment and accessibility, we may shift our
attention away from the bad actor and toward the phenomena
that shape his perceptions, interpretations, and motivations.
Our reactive attitudes toward people who do bad things are
reconstituted as reactions to the environmental and cultural
influences that control their schemas. In this way, schematic
psychology diverts the volatile energy fueling our reactive
attitudes so that it attaches not to the bad actor, but to the
environmental and cultural phenomena that drive his schematic
cognition.
If this is right, schematic psychology does more than merely
suggest we lack some quality necessary for responsibility. It
raises more fundamental concerns about conventional accounts of
responsibility. In schematic psychology's light, we see how
"I5 See WATSON, supra note 304, at 245.
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conventional accounts of responsibility, focusing entirely on what
qualities the responsible actor must have, overlook the
significance of his relationship to the world around him.
Resentment and indignation become more complicated, and we
worry that they are misdirected and arbitrary. The reactive
attitudes that ground our responsibility attributions are
undermined.
As I have argued elsewhere, arguments like these, showing
how personal history undermines attribution of blame, parallel
and supplement another sort of argument already in circulation
in criminal theory-the argument that "rotten social background"
should reduce or defeat criminal responsibility. As Watson's
piece highlights, learning about a wrongdoer's history of personal
suffering and struggle tends to undermine our "normal" resentful
and indignant attitudes toward him,316 especially when that
background involves abuse and suffering during formative years.
The argument developed here makes an analogous but more
subtle point, identifying another distinct vector along which
personal history might influence our reactive attitudes.
Schematic psychology suggests that there is an entire universe of
experiences-both formative and fleeting-that can influence us
without any hint of brutality or coercion.
This supplements Watson's insight in an important way.
While Watson draws our attention to a narrow and rare
phenomenon in human experience, schematic psychology
describes a ubiquitous one. Likewise, while Watson's discussion
describes an easily spotted and recognized phenomenon,
schematic psychology describes formative and fleeting influences
that may be so subtle or mundane appearing that they go
entirely unnoticed. Moreover, while Watson's discussion
highlights a formative influence that is intuitively easy to grasp
(violence begets violence), schematic psychology puts a spotlight
on processes that seem, in some ways, quite alien. Schema
history information then, describes an aspect of personal history
that rotten background information omits, an aspect that is more
unexpected and less intuitive than typical rotten background
information. As a result, schema history may challenge the
reactive attitudes associated with responsibility attribution in
316 See, e.g., id. at 244 (demonstrating this phenomenon with regard to
knowledge of a wrongdoer's history).
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ways that rotten background does not, and the two together may
undercut those attitudes more thoroughly than rotten
background can on its own. In this sense, schematic psychology
does not just rehash familiar rotten background arguments; it
supplements and broadens their central insight. In so doing, it
may significantly strengthen our sense that personal history can
dramatically undercut the reactive attitudes associated with
responsibility attributions.
Schematic psychology then, elicits substantial fairness
concerns in holding persons responsible for their bad acts. These
fairness concerns have the potential to undercut the reactive
attitudes associated with responsibility attributions and to
supplement other challenges to those reactive attitudes. In this
way, schematic psychology offers new ammunition to support the
old argument that, given the deep involvement of culture and
circumstance in each human act, the practice of holding persons
responsible is unsustainable.
IV. CONCLUSION
Schematic psychology's findings are both illuminating and
disturbing. Although they help us understand some of the most
interesting phenomena in human cognition, they also undercut
conventional moral psychology in several important ways. Our
reliance on knowledge structures, while serving a vital purpose,
also assures that our understanding of the world is biased
in startlingly fundamental ways. Our knowledge structures
silently and significantly influence our motivations and our
interpretations of ambiguous events. They even influence the
most fundamental process in our cognition about the world-our
perception of it. Moreover, they generally do so in ways that we
are unaware of and cannot control and in ways that can be in
tension with, or even in outright conflict with, our preferences
and values. In short, as so many other lines in contemporary
empirical psychology do, schematic psychology shows that we do
not think the way we think we do, that we are susceptible to
biases and errors in ways we generally do not realize, that we are
driven by motivations we do not recognize, and, thus, that we are
not who we think we are.
Schematic psychology also brings out another pervasive
theme in contemporary empirical psychology: Namely, that we
are in a very deep sense creations of the world around us.
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Our knowledge structures give us our distinctive and
characteristic perceptual biases, interpretive tendencies, and
motivational profiles-but we receive much of our knowledge
structure endowment from culture, environment, and contingent
experience. Accessibility determines just which of the knowledge
structures in our endowment is active at any given time, but
accessibility depends on the various chronic stimuli and passing
primes presented to us by our environment. So many of the
things I think about when I think about what makes me "me"-
my distinctive perspectives and expectations, preferences, and
motivations-are constructed by cultural and environmental
influences that I generally cannot see and cannot control.
"We are not who we think we are." "We are creations of the
world around us." These are insights that have ramifications for
moral and criminal responsibility. In this Article, I have
attempted to bring some of these ramifications out. I have
suggested that schematic psychology supports an internal
challenge to conventional accounts of responsibility by raising
the possibility that we sometimes lack the moral sensitivity
required for moral responsibility, that we are not responsible for
this deficit, and that it happens much more frequently than we
realize. I have also suggested that schematic psychology
supports an external challenge to conventional accounts of
responsibility by aggressively eroding the reactive attitudes
associated with responsibility attribution-and doing so in a way
that reinforces and expands other challenges to those reactive
attitudes.
Neither challenge, I think, constitutes a complete challenge
to responsibility. Indeed, each can be understood to leave room
for holding persons responsible, morally and criminally. The
internal challenge suggests that we sometimes lack a capacity
necessary for responsibility but leaves open the possibility that
we have that capacity at other times. The external challenge
erodes the reactive attitudes associated with responsibility but
may not entirely disintegrate those reactive attitudes.
But this does not mean that the challenge from schematic
psychology is fruitless. On the contrary, as I have suggested, the
challenge from schematic psychology should not be looked at in a
vacuum; for it is a challenge to responsibility that works in
concert with others. For example, as my discussion has
explained, the schematic challenge parallels and supplements
2009]
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the set of sociological and psychological insights that are said to
motivate rotten social background challenges to responsibility. It
also complements other responsibility-eroding insights that I
have not discussed here, including some grounded in other areas
of empirical psychology, such as situationist psychology. v Even
if none of these challenges individually presents a complete
challenge to responsibility, they cover substantial ground
together. More than that, cumulating their impact highlights the
likelihood that further research will further flesh out the
challenge.
If this is right, then schematic psychology gives us good
reason to reconsider our commitment to contemporary accounts
of moral and criminal responsibility. In the light of schematic
psychology, they lose some of their luster. It becomes apparent
that they rest on an inaccurate moral psychology and that, as a
result, they entail significant problems of fairness.
... See generally Kaye, supra note 312.
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